This copy has been provided by the UBC Archives [or UBC Rare Books and Special Collections] and is to be used solely for research or private study.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

Roy Miki fonds
RARE BOOKS AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

A CALL FOR REDRESS:

The Japanese Canadian Case

Introduction:

Between 1941 and 1949 over 20,000 Canadian residents of Japanese ancestry were uprooted from their homes, confined in detention camps, stripped of their property and forced to disperse across Canada or be shipped to war-torn Japan. Over three quarters of those treated in this manner were Canadian citizens. Although opposed by those among the police and military responsible for national security,[1] these policies were implemented by orders in council under the War Measures Act ostensibly for reasons of national security.

DRAFT

Today forty-two years later, the government's own documents show the official reason for the repressive treatment of Japanese Canadians in World War II to be completely groundless. These documents show no basis in national security for the uprooting, detention, impoverishment and attempted deportation of Canada's Japanese population. Rather they demonstrate that the wartime abuse of Japanese Canadians was motivated by political opportunism. They show that certain Ministers in the Cabinet of the day exploited public prejudice in the hope of electoral success in British Columbia.

To implement their "final solution" to the "Japanese problem" in British Columbia, [2] those Ministers used their unfettered powers under the War Measures Act. Orders in council passed under the authority of that act, while written to give the impression that

---

[1] A.G. Sunahara, **The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians in World War II**, 1981: Lorimer, 31 -33. For full documentation of the facts in this brief the reader is referred to this reference.

[2] The term "final solution" with respect to the "problem" of Asians in Canada can be found as early as 1938 in **Confidential Report to Council on the Oriental Problem in Canada** prepared by the Director of Immigration, F.C. Blair. Department of External Affairs, File 263-38(4), External Affairs Archives (hereafter E.A.A.)

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

they were intended to protect Japanese Canadians from a hostile public and to preserve national security, were used to carry out policies far less benign. To demonstrate this abuse of emergency powers, and to show the price paid by 20,000 innocent people to satisfy the political ambitions of those Ministers, this brief reviews the events surrounding the treatment of Japanese Canadians in World War II. It begins with a review of the prewar situation. It then examines the uprooting of Japanese Canadians from their homes on the Pacific coast and their incarceration in shack camps and ghost towns in the Interior of British Columbia and on sugar beet farms in Alberta and Manitoba. In subsequent sections it examines how Japanese Canadians were stripped of their possessions by men who hoped to gain political support from returning war veterans, and reviews the attempt by those politicians to deport Canadian citizens to war-torn Japan. Finally it briefly examines the reluctant postwar attempt to pay minimal compensation for a small part of the economic losses suffered by Japanese Canadians during their wartime ordeal.

DRAFT

Background

The policy of garnering political support by appealing to the prejudices of a small segment of the elctorate was well established by 1942. For most of the previous seventy years, Asians were the scapegoats of British Columbia's politicians. Traditionally politicians from that province had avoided responsibility for British Columbia's social and economic problems by blaming them on the Asian population. They damned Asians for having a lower standard of living and also damned them for working hard to raise it. Asians in British Columbia, whether citizens or not were political and social outcasts. They were denied the vote and access to most of the professions. The public service and teaching were closed to them. By legislation and social practise the economic opportunities of Asians were limited to fishing, farming, small service businesses and menial occupations.

With the growing power of Imperial Japan and the modest economic success of Japanese immigrants and their Canadian children, Japanese Canadians became the primary target of racist politicians. [3]. In the dying days of white supremacy, neither of the major

---

[3]For example in the 1920's and 1930's the federal government tried to drive Japanese Canadians from the fishing industry by denying them fishing licences, cut back Japanese immigration to a maximum of 150 persons annually, and refused to enfranchise Canadians of Japanese ancestry. For a full account of the discrimination experienced by Japanese Canadians see Ken Adachi, **The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians** Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

political parties seriously questioned the practise of discriminating against Japanese Canadians when that discrimination could win the support of Canada's hardcore minority of bigoted voters. [4]

Despite this history of discrimination, Japanese Canadians in 1941 were optimistic about their fate should Japan and Canada go to war. In November 1941, the editor of the **New Canadian**, a Japanese Canadian newspaper, confidently assured his readers that in the event of war with Japan, "inflamed public opinion will probably be more serious and more injurious than official government policy."[5]. He based his opinion on Prime Minister King's refusal in 1940 to bend to hysterial public opinion demanding the internment of massive numbers of German and Italian Canadians. [6] This relatively moderate policy was consistent with the treatment accorded enemy aliens in World War I when the Borden government resisted similar demands from veterans groups to intern 80,000 enemy aliens. [7]

The editor of the **New Canadian** could not know that the standard applied to white Canadians in 1940 would not be applied to Japanese Canadians in 1942. Although those responsible for Canada's internal security, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, had investigated the Japanese community and concluded that Japanese Canadians represented no danger to national security, [8] there were others in Ottawa willing to sacrifice at least the non-Canadian portion of that community to the demands of public prejudice. In 1939 the federal Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property officially recorded their opinion that in the event of war with Japan "public feeling" in British Columbia would be so strong that "it might be necessary to recommend the internment of nearly all enemy nationals" both to prevent sabotage and for their own protection.[9] The committee, however, made no recommendations as to how the expected

DRAFT

---

[4]For example one slogan used in the 1935 federal election was: A Vote for ANY C.C.F. Candidate is a VOTE TO GIVE the CHINAMAN and JAPANESE the same Voting Right that you have! Vancouver **Sun**, October 7, 1935.
[5] **The New Canadian**, November 21, 1941.
[6]Only the leaders of German and Italian fascist organizations were interned in the Second World War.
[7]J. A. Carruthers, "The Great War and Canada's Enemy Alien Policy", 4 **Queen's L.J.** 43 at 104 - 105.
[8]F.J. Mead, Asst Comnr, to S.T. Wood, Comnr R.C.M.P., August 21, 1940, RG 24, vol 2730, file HQS-5199x, P.A.C. See also the quote from this document on page 7 infra.
[9]Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, **First Interim Report** February 9, 1939, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 32, file X-52, p. 2. P.A.C.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

"public feeling" might be defused. Rather their recommendation, in accordance with past policy with respect to enemy nationals, victimized the enemy national and ignored the instigators of violence against them.

In 1938 the Deputy Minister of National Defence, L.R. Lafleche, informed the federal Interdepartmental Committee on Orientals – without citing any evidence and indeed while acknowledging that internal security was the jurisdiction of another department, the R.C.M.P. – that he doubted the loyalty of "even Canadian nationals of Japanese ancestry". "It follows," he continued that his department "may someday find itself required to provide facilities for the detention of upward of 10,000 persons in British Columbia" in the event of war with Japan.[10] Given that there were approximately 22,000 Japanese Canadians in British Columbia in 1941, only 3000 of whom were Japanese nationals, Lafleche's estimate of 10,000 represents every male Japanese Canadian over the age of ten.

In hindsight it is not surprising that this most extreme of prewar positions was advanced by the Deputy of the man who was Minister of National Defence at that time, Ian Alistair Mackenzie, [11] Member of Parliament for Vancouver Centre and the political strategist behind the Liberal party's traditionally anti-Asian election campaigns in British Columbia. Mackenzie was the only British Columbian in the Cabinet in 1941. As such he was by default and by his own inclination the Cabinet's "expert" on the "Oriental problem". In a busy Cabinet that believed the government should follow the status quo in racial matters[12], Asians and their plight were a purely secondary matter, a distasteful anomaly of British Columbian politics. Discriminatory laws and practices were seldom questioned. Typically, the Cabinet would defer to Mackenzie on such matters. The willingness of the Cabinet to defer to Mackenzie is evident from Mackenzie's 1940 correspondence with the Minister of Fisheries, J.E. Michaud, on the subject of fishing licences for Japanese Canadians. Michaud wrote:

> I have always found it difficult to justify this arbitrary legislation against British subjects of Japanese origin. This year in view of the reasons that we are giving for our participation in the European War, it would seem all the more difficult to explain why we are adopting against these British subjects of Japanese origin the technique that Hitler adopted against the Czechs, the Slovaks and the

---

[10]L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence, to F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Ottawa, June 2, 1938, Extract from HQS 7368, vol 1, microreel 629A P.A.B.C.

[11]Mackenzie was shifted to the less demanding Department of Pensions and Health on the outbreak of the Second World War.

[12]Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, as quoted in **Nisei Affairs**, August 28, 1945.

DRAFT

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

Poles.

Of course I am willing to be guided by your opinion with the assurance that when the time comes you will justify my arbitrary attitude.[13]

Where the demands of morality conflicted with the demands of politics Ian Mackenzie's opinion that the racist policies should continue on the grounds of political expediency, normally prevailed.

The anti-Asian Mackenzie was important not only as the Cabinet's main source of information on Japanese Canadians and as the final authority on policies affecting Asian Canadians, but also because of his attitudes toward the virtually unfettered powers of Cabinet under the War Measures Act. While the Cabinet's broad wartime powers bothered some Ministers, [14]. for Mackenzie they provided an opportunity to get things done without having to answer for them. To Mackenzie the war and the War Measures Act afforded an opportunity to implement "Damn the Japs" policies he boasted would win the Liberals every seat in British Columbia[15]. In reply to a fellow Minister in 1942 who queried the legality of stripping Japanese Canadians of their property. Mackenzie wrote: "[W]e should not be deterred by any representations by Japanese. Any action we take under the War Measures Act cannot be challenged in the courts"[16]. As Mackenzie correctly recognized every Canadian is at the mercy of the Executive when the War Measures Act is in force.

DRAFT

Removal and Detention

Japanese Canadians were uprooted from their homes on the Pacific Coast under the authority of P.C. 1486[17] a scant 12 weeks after Canada and Japan went to war. That far-reaching order did not contain the word "Japanese". Rather P.C. 1486 was directed at "any or all persons ordinarily or actually resident" within any area of Canada defined as a "protected area" by the Minister of Justice. It empowered that Minister to control everyone's movement, employment, residence, freedom of association and communication, and their right to possess any specified article. It also authorized the

---

[13]J.E. Michaud to Ian Mackenzie, January 17, 1940, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 19, file 29-7, P.A.C.
[14]Notably C.G. Power, J.L. Ilsley, and T.A. Crerar. See R. Cook, "Canadian Freedom in Wartime" in W.H. Heick and R. Graham (eds), **His Own Man:Essays in Honour of Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower**, 1974:McGill-Queens, p. 45 and Sunahara, supra, 108 - 109, 149.
[15]**Macleans**, April 15, 1946, pp. 65 - 66.
[16]I.A. Mackenzie to N.A. McLarty, June 5, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, Vol 25, P.A.C.
[17] February 24, 1942.

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

Minister to order any and all persons to leave the area in question and to detain them "in any place and under such conditions as he may from time to time direct"[18]. While the order in council was broad enough to affect every resident of Canada, the ministerial order[19] made under it on February 26, 1942 was directed only at "persons of the Japanese race". The government's rationale for the order was "national security". The removal of Japanese Canadians from the Pacific coast, Prime Minister King told the House of Commons, was necessary to safeguard the defences of that coast[20].

To support its national security argument the government cited hostile public opinion on the Pacific Coast and the possibility of civil disorder resulting from it. The picture painted is of a British Columbian public seething with hatred and hysteria demanding the removal of Japanese Canadians from their midst. The truth of that picture is undermined by the government's own files. Those files show not mass hysteria but a well orchestrated campaign of pressure from specific anti-Asian groups in British Columbia. Prime Minister King's external affairs files[21] contain only 100 letters and resolutions received between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the decision to uproot Japanese Canadians on February 24, 1942. [22]. The bulk of the letters and resolutions in those files that demand the removal of Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast came from veterans' and political organizations with overlapping memberships. These were the same organizations that had unsuccessfully lobbied for the internment of German and Italian Canadians in 1940. Moreover, the majority of these organizations were located on Vancouver Island, in particular in and around Victoria. By comparison few of the letters and resolution received before the decision to uproot Japanese Canadians was announced came from the British Columbia mainland where 75% of Japanese Canadians lived. In contast prominent among the letters from the mainland received after that decision was announced are letters from Caucasian farmers in the Fraser Valley asking the government to spare their Japanese neighbours. [23] The government's own files, plus other disinterested assessments[24], suggest that the demands

DRAFT

---

[18]Ibid.
[19]See Appendix
[20]Canada, House of Commons, **Debates**, February 25, 1942, p. 180.
[21]King also held the portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs.
[22]Department of External Affairs Archives, file 773-b-1-40, parts 1 and 2. E.A.A. See Appendix for a detailed list.
[23]Ibid, part 3.
[24]See C.B.C.'s assessment, Sunahara, p. 34.

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

for the removal of Japanese Canadians were coming from certain small, politically powerful groups. There is no denying that the people of B.C. were concerned, but support for the hysteria argument in the period *before* the decision to uproot is not as strong as has been alleged.

The potential for civil disorder was real. The R.C.M.P. had closely monitored anti-Japanese sentiment since Japan had formally joined the Axis powers in 1940. The security experts had concluded, however, that any threat to public order came from the activities of west coast racists who were seeking to build a power base on an anti-Japanese platform. In 1940 the R.C.M.P. officer responsible for west coast security, Asst. Comnr. F.J. Mead reported that

> No fear of sabotage need be expected from the Japanese in Canada. I feel this is a broad statement, at the same time I know it to be true. ... The greatest danger lies in the provocative and at times like these, downright dangerous agitation of [certain named politicians]. [25]

Canada's senior military officers were of the same opinion in late December 1941. Responding to an inquiry from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Chiefs of General Staff stated that

> members of the special government committee as well as the military, police and local authorities, were concerned less about the possibility of subversive activity by Japanese than at the danger of serious anti-Japanese outbreaks by the white population.[26].

To Canada's security experts the way to defuse the possibility for civil disorder was to take action against those inciting the riot, not their potential victims[27].

While the R.C.M.P. had responded to the threat posed by racist agitators with informal arrangements with the press about the publicity to be given to the activities and allegations of such men, [28] no Cabinet Minister nor any B.C. politician[29], attempted to defuse the anti-Japanese fears that could produce disorder.[30] Quite the contrary, the

---

[25]F.J. Mead, Asst Comnr, to S.T. Wood, Comnr R.C.M.P., August 21, 1940, RG 24, vol 2730, file HQS-5199x, P.A.C.

[26]Cabinet War Committee, **Minutes**, December 29, 1941, RG2/16, P.A.C.

[27]H.L. Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Sectretary of State for External Affairs, to Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Vice Chief of General Staff, January 3, 1942, with Pope's agreement, file 773-B-40, DEA

[28]For the most part the media exercised remarkable restraint, especially when compared to the vitriolic lies being pumped out in the same period by the anti-Asian Hearst press in the United States. For the American situation see Roger Daniels, **Concentration Camps U.S.A.**, 1971: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson.

[29]except the single C.C.F. politician, Angus MacInnis

[30] apart from a statement in support of Japanese Canadian loyalty on the day after the Pearl Harbor attack. W.L.M. King Diary, December 7, 1941, P.A.C.

DRAFT

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

government's actions only reinforced the public's fears. By shutting down the Japanese Canadian fishing industry[31] where all fishermen were Canadians, by registering Canadians of Japanese ancestry as if they were enemy nationals, by ordering the removal of adult male Japanese nationals, against the advice of the military and the R.C.M.P. [32] while claiming it was necessary for national security,[33] the Cabinet gave substance to the rumours being spread about Japanese Canadians. By adopting such stringent measures, the government confirmed in the minds of the public that there was in fact a threat to national security.

The sharp difference of opinion between the professionals and the politicians on the "Japanese question" is readily apparent from the records of a Conference on the Japanese Problem in B.C. held in Ottawa in early January 1942. At that conference the military and the R.C.M.P. reiterated their opinion that Japanese Canadians were loyal and that measures already in force for the internal defence of the Pacific Coast were adequate.[34] The Department of External Affairs appealed for cooperation and expressed its fears that unnecessary repression against Japanese Canadians might make matters worse for Canadians captured at Hong Kong or trapped in Japan[35]. To the B.C. politicians at the conference, however, the loyalty of Japanese Canadians was immaterial. The possibility of civil disorder, however caused, and the "heaven sent opportunity to rid themselves of the Japanese *economic* menace for ever more"[36] were all that mattered.

DRAFT

The opinion of the professionals may never have reached the Cabinet as a whole. Since Cabinet ministers do not have the time to familiarize themselves with all aspects of the policies that Cabinet must approve, Cabinet decisions are normally based on the

---

[31]P.C. 288, January 13, 1942.

[32]Conference on the Japanese Problem in B.C., **Report**, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C. which reads in part

> The conference considered a proposal that all Japanese nationals (or at least all males between 18 and 45) ... be compulsorily removed ....The majority of the Conference did not accept this proposal. ... The representatives of the Department of National Defence, National Defence for Naval Services, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police assured the Conference that the requirements of national defence and security can be met by the measures already taken or recommended, and do not warrant such action.

[33]P.C. 365, January 16, 1942.

[34]See note 32.

[35]Conference on Japanese Problems, **Minutes**, p. 6, Dept. of External Affairs file 773-B-40C, E.A.A.

[36] Maurice A. Pope, **Soldiers and Politicians**, 1962: University of Toronto Press, p. 177. Pope's emphasis. The "economic menace" comment arises from the fact that for seventy years B.C. politicians had blamed the province's economic woes on non-whites whose lower wages were portrayed as undermining white living standards. The same politicians, however, were unwilling to pass legislation requiring equal pay for equal work.

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

information presented by the responsible Ministers. In 1942 the Cabinet's principal avenue of information on Japanese Canadians was Ian Mackenzie. Mackenzie's presentation of the report on the January conference of Japanese Canadians differs markedly from the Minutes of that meeting as prepared by the Department of External Affairs. [37] Throwing his considerable political weight behind the opinion of the politicians who wanted to intern male Japanese nationals, Mackenzie played up the possiblility of civil disorder. To undermine the opinion of the R.C.M.P. and Ottawa's senior military officers that an incarceration of Japanese nationals was unwarranted, Mackenzie used, out of context, the views of the senior officer on the west coast Maj. Gen. R.O. Alexander. Alexander, following private discussions with B.C. politicians, had proposed three weeks after Pearl Harbor that all adult male Japanese Canadians be interned to prevent riots he thought might follow scheduled anti-Japanese demonstrations. [38] Alexander's proposal was rejected by his superiors who were "unable to agree to such a drastic step as Vancouver is subject only to bombardment and the Japanese, of whom 80 percent are Canadian nationals, are unarmed."[39] However, in accordance with past policy Mackenzie's opinion prevailed and the Cabinet ordered the removal of 1700 male Japanese nationals from the Pacific Coast of British Columbia.[40]

DRAFT

In subsequent Cabinet discussions Mackenzie, ignoring the counsel of the R.C.M.P. and the pleas of External Affairs, continually argued that even Canadians of Japanese ancestry were disloyal. [41] By February 22nd he had obtained the agreement of Cabinet that

---

[37] See Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M.King, January 10, 1942, and Conference of the Japanese Problem in B.C., **Report**, Ian Mackenzie Papers MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C.; and Conference on Japanese Problems, **Minutes**, p. 6, Dept. of External Affairs file 7[illegible]3-B-40C, E.A.A.

[38] Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M. King, January 10, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol 32, file x-81, P.A.C. For the complete proposal see Maj. Gen. R.O. Alexander to Chief of General Staff, December 30, 1941, file 322.009(D358), Department of National Defense.

[39] Summary of Memorandum, Vice Chief of General Staff to Chief of General Staff, January 13, 1942, extracted from HQS 7368, vol 1, Defence Records, 322.009(D358), Directorate of History, D.N.D. Alexander was removed from his command within three weeks of the order uprooting Japanese Canadians.

[40] P.C. 288, January 13, 1942.

[41] For example on January 26, 1942 Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs pleaded with Mackenzie to moderate the demands of the B.C. M.P.'s for policies that were not only inherently unjust and opposed by the military and R.C.M.P., but that might place the soldiers captured at Hong Kong in jeopardy. H.L. Keenleyside to Ian Mackenzie and W.L.M. King, January 26, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81(2), P.A.C. For Mackenzie's views see Sunahara, 42. While making these charges Mackenzie was trying to organize a Civilian Service Corps for male Canadians of Japanese ancestry, a corps he presumed they would join to prove their loyalty. Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M.King, January 10, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

FOLDER NO. 7

has risen for the Japanese also, more or less in proportion to the General Canadian index.

7. In some camps the pressure would not be felt as much as in others, due first of all, to lesser freight costs, and secondly, to the fact that there has been extensive land cultivation during the past year, and sizeable crops of vegetables have been raised to supplement the general diet - thereby reducing the cost. Tashme would appear to be the best location in this regard - and Sandon the worst.

I recommend that an endeavor be ma de by the Protecting Power to obtain from the Canadian Authorities a slight increase in the prevailing rates - for those that for one reason or another are unable to accept or secure gainful employment; or failing this - and perhaps more acceptable to the Detaining Power, a free per-capita ration of one or two items of the basic Japanese diet, such as rice, or bread. The amount to be a rrived at after careful consideration of supplies, consumption, etc.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

C249600

P.50-9
V.4(c)

SECRET

Memorandum for Mr. Wrong.

re Policy regarding Japanese in Canada.

Deportation

Notices to Persons of the Japanese Race, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 16, File 622, P.A.C.

Public Reaction to the Deportation of Japanese Canadians

R.G. Robertson, Assistant to the Prime Minister, to H.H. Wrong, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 24, 1945, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 361, C249600 - C249606, P.A.C.

Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, January 5, 1946, W.L.M.King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, File 2965, C194932, P.A.C.

R.G. Robertson to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, March 4, 1946, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, file 2965, P.A.C.

Minutes of a Meeting Concerning the Problem of Japanese in Canada, March 26, 1946, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, File 2965, C194959 - C194963, P.A.C.

W.L.M. King Diary, January 22, 1947, P.A.C.

This series of documents illustrates firstly how the "loyalty survey" was presented to Japanese Canadians and secondly how it was opposed by the Canadian people. In the first document it is important to note on page 3 that submissions received by the government before the decision to deport 10,000 Japanese Canadians were 19 to 85 against all Japanese being deported. The second documents illustrates that senior civil servants were aware that their policies were discriminatory but were still content with "political" solutions. The third document illustrates the surge of letters and resolutions produced by the anti-deportation campaign, while fourth document illustrates the public attitudes of many of the players. The last document, an extract from Prime Minister King's diary, shows how the deportation issue ended.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

C249600

P-30-9
V-4(c)

SECRET

Memorandum for Mr. Wrong.

re Policy regarding Japanese in Canada.

1. The letter of October 15 to Mr. St. Laurent from Mr. Coldwell regarding policy toward the Japanese in Canada is, I think, indicative of the embarrassment in which the government is likely to find itself unless certain aspects of the present policy are reviewed. In the course of a conversation yesterday, Mr. Coldwell said that his party were going to take the government heavily to task over the Japanese policy.

With regard to Mr. Coldwell's letter itself, I have ascertained that Mr. St. Laurent has not yet replied to it. It seems to me that, either through Cabinet agreement or simply with the concurrence of the Minister of Labour, Mr. Coldwell should be assured that no action with regard to deportation is contemplated until after the Prime Minister's return, and that rumours concerning immediate deportation are inaccurate. It might also be desirable to refute the suggestion that any "improper pressure" was put on the Japanese to get applications for repatriation. The instructions were specifically against any pressure whatever, and the report by Mr. Haag to the International Red Cross (about June of this year) was to the effect that there was no evidence of pressure. It is significant that none of the letters here requesting withdrawl of applications suggest any pressure or undue influence.

2. So far as the policy is concerned, I think that the government has not gone so far that it cannot withdraw somewhat without too much difficulty. The only public statement of policy has been that of the Prime Minister in the House on August 4, 1944. That statement was well received and so far as I know it has not been attacked except by some extreme "exclusionists". The "questionnaire"

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

C249601

regarding repatriation can be defended as an entirely voluntary procedure, and charges of pressure can be refuted. It is not inconsistent with the August 4 statement. The point that seems to require review is the Cabinet decision of September 19, 1945, approving the Cabinet Committee report of September 5, 1945 to the effect that applicants for repatriation should be deported as soon as possible "with the exception of Canadian citizens who had made application for revocation of their request for repatriation prior to midnight, September 1, 1945". It was decided to allow no withdrawl of applications whatever in the case of Japanese nationals (or, rather, non-Canadian Japanese, since many are dual nationals.) It will, I think, be possible to defend the refusal to allow any withdrawal of applications by the non-Canadian Japanese, but it is becoming increasingly clear that it is going to be very difficult to refuse to consider withdrawals after September 1 from Canadian citizens, especially in view of the U.S. "Bill of Rights" protection in parallel cases.

3. The essential elements of policy in the Prime Minister's statement in 1944 were as follows:

(a) Examination of Japanese by a "quasi-judicial commission" to determine those loyal and those disloyal.

(b) Deportation of the disloyal - British subjects among these to have their status revoked.

(c) Loyal Japanese to be allowed to stay.

(d) Resettlement throughout Canada.

(e) No future immigration.

The questionnaire can logically be regarded as a preliminary to (a) in order to separate out those Japanese who do not wish to stay here and so need not be examined. So far as non-Canadian Japanese are concerned, it can be held that, as enemy aliens they have no right whatever to

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

be allowed to stay in Canada, and that their application for repatriation will be held to be conclusive in all cases. But in the case of Japanese who are British subjects it can be well argued that those who applied and then withdrew may have been guilty of nothing more than an initial error that they tried to rectify. To hold them to their original application can be attacked as a denial of their rights as Canadian citizens and British subjects on straight racial grounds. There is no doubt but that in many cases the applications for "repatriation" reflected, not a desire to go to Japan, but dispair of ever securing a livelihood or fair treatment in Canada in the future.

4. There has been a decided increase in interest in the government policy with regard to Japanese, and the pressure now is almost entirely in favour of a moderate policy. The lead in this has largely been given by church groups and the Winnipeg "Free Press". It is significant that the Toronto "Star" and the Ottawa "Journal" also have taken the matter up in editorials this week. Apart from arguing in favour of a moderate policy in general, the most frequent specific demand is that Japanese who are British subjects and who signed applications to go to Japan, should be given the right to withdraw their applications.

To secure some indication of the trend in vocal opinion, I have checked the files here with regard to submissions received on the Japanese policy, with the following results:

Date	Submissions urging that all Japanese be deported.	Submissions for a moderate policy
1942	2	3
1943	2	1
1944	8	4
1945		
(a) until June 30	4	4
(b) June 30-Aug 31	2	36
(c) Since Sept. 1	1	37

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

C249603

On October 20 alone there were 7 letters and telegrams to the Prime Minister urging a moderate policy.

The organizations that have sent in submissions in favour of total deportation have generally been Boards of Trade in British Columbia, fishermen's and lumbermen's organizations in B.C. etc. Some of the organizations arguing a moderate policy are the following:

National Interchurch Advisory Committee on Resettlement of Japanese Canadians (Represents the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, the Baptist Church, the Presbyterian Church, and the United Church of Canada.)

Y.M.C.A'S

University S.C.M.

Toronto Welfare Chest

Canadian Friends Service Committee

Japanese Settlement Council, Hamilton.

The Vancouver Advisory Council.

Various church organizations and conferences, etc.

In addition to the above submissions, over 45 form letters have been received here urging a moderate policy and permission to Japanese Canadians to withdraw applications for repatriation. Many more have been received by External Affairs, Labour and Justice.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

C247603H

5. Any moderation of the present policy will be strongly opposed by B.C. members on the government side and by many in the province in general. However, there may be some significance in the fact that, with the C.C.F. in B.C. definitely committed to lenient treatment of the Japanese, it has not, apparently, been worth the other parties' while in the provincial election to make an issue of this. As a gauge of possible reaction in the country, the Gallup Poll of February, 1944, may also be of some value. It's results were as follows:

(a) On the question of deportation of Japanese nationals:

Deport	- 80%
Allow to stay	- 14%
Undecided	- 6%

(b) On the question of deportation of Canadian citizens of Japanese race:

Deport	- 33%
Allow to stay	- 59%
Undecided	- 8%

It was stated that the B.C. figures were in line with the above national averages.

On the question of principle and constitutional right there can be no doubt but that greater regard should be had for requests from Canadian citizens to withdraw applications for repatriation than that authorized in the recent Cabinet decision, and it is equally clear that the government is going to be strongly attacked if it does not recognize this. The embarrassment of the government last year over the elections act amendment indicates a strong feeling that treatment must be fair.

6. According to an analysis by Mr. Pickersgill, the Commissioner of Japanese Placement, on August 31, the results of the questionnaire on repatriation are as follows:

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

C249691

Number involved in application for repatriation - 10,397

- Japanese nationals - 3,020
- Naturalized Canadians - 1,474
- Canadian-born - 5,903

10,397

Number of Canadian-born who signed declaration - 2,461

Number of Canadian-born under 16 who are included under parental certificates - 3,494

Number of Japanese nationals who did not sign -3,596

Number of their dependent children -2,230

According to the 1941 census, the Japanese population of Canada was as follows:

Born in Canada	- 14,073
Naturalized in Canada	- 3,155
Born in other British countries	- 12
Total British subjects	17,220
Japanese Nationals	5,911
Others	18
	23,149

The number of Canadian-born who signed applications is 2,461. Presumably all, or nearly all, of the naturalized group would be over 16 and would be individual signatories. Thus the total of Canadian citizens who signed is probably about 2,461 plus 1,474 = 3,935. There are no figures on the number of dependents with the group, so it is impossible on the basis of the available statistics to know how great the total might be who would be affected by a decision to extend the right to

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

withdraw application for repatriation. It is stated, however, that the 3,596 Japanese nationals who did not sign have 2,230 dependent children. If the 3,020 Japanese nationals involved in applications similarly include about 2,000 children, the total group of Canadian citizens plus dependents may be about 10,397 minus 5,020 = 5,377 -- or about half the total.

7. It would appear from the above very uncertain figures and deductions that if it were decided to give consideration to any and all applications from Canadian citizens for withdrawal of applications, not more than 5,000 out of the present group of 10,000 could be affected. Probably the actual group involved would be much less. Up to August 31 the Commission had received 154 applications for withdrawal from Canadians. The Prime Minister's Office has received (and passed on) the following total:

to August 31	-	16
September	-	44
October	-	86
		146

The figures are steadily growing, but they are still only a small fraction of the potential total, it would seem.

8. It is clear that the whole matter is going to come up in the House - presumably on either the Labour or External Affairs estimates. I would suggest, for consideration, that what might be done would be to have a statement by the Prime Minister reaffirming the policy of August, 1944; explaining the purpose of the questionnaire; announcing that the Commission would be set up immediately; and stating that, to quiet any fears of pressure, applications for withdrawal from Canadian citizens would be accepted up to (e.g.) Dec. 31, 1945. At the same time it might be announced that restrictions on the holding and acquisition of land outside of the protected area of B.C. were being lifted to encourage resettlement eastward. Presumably nothing could be said

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

C249605

about arrangements with the provinces other than that they would be taken up after the Commission had completed its work of selection of the undesirables.

9. I do not know what immediate steps, if any, should be taken in this matter.

R.G.R.

R.G. ROBERTSON

24th October, 1945.

RGR/JMC

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

all male Canadians of Japanese ancestry would be conscripted into a Civilian Service Corps. On February 26, after the news that the American government intended to uproot 110,000 Japanese Americans reached Ottawa, the Cabinet ordered the removal 20,000 Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast.

Besides Mackenzie there were six other Cabinet Ministers who had firsthand knowledge that the military and the R.C.M.P. opposed the further victimization of Japanese Canadians. Of those six[42] only one, J.L. Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, was likely to speak out in Cabinet in support of Japanese Canadians.[43] Ralston would have emphatically informed the Cabinet of the military's opinion had he been present. Unfortunately Ralston was absent when Mackenzie persuaded the Cabinet to incarcerate all male Japanese nationals in work camps. He was also absent when the decision to uproot all Japanese Canadians was taken. [44] Indeed, at the time that decision was taken Ralston was in conference preparing for a major speech to a secret sitting[45] of Parliament at which, his notes indicate, he informed Parliament of the impossibility of a west coast invasion and of the adequacy of home defence.[46] Moreover, Ralston's support of Canada's senior military officers when they refused two days later to carry out the uprooting of Japanese

---

[42] J.E. Michaud, Minister of Fisheries; J.T. Thorson, Minister of National War Services; Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour; Louis St. Laurent, Minister of Justice; J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence; and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in his capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs. The first two attended the January conference, while the rest had contact with the issues in their ministerial capacity.

[43] Michaud had long followed Mackenzie's lead in discriminating against Asians. See p. 4, supra. Thorson would later distinguish himself as the Justice who withheld his decision on the legality of the forced sale of Japanese Canadian property under P.C. 486 while his former Cabinet collegues sold off that property, thereby stifling the legal objections of Japanese Canadians, and as the intolerant anglophone who challenged the constitutionality of French as an official language. See **Nakashima et al. v. The King** [1947] Ex. C. R. 486 and **Thorson v. A.G. Canada et al.** [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138. King, already at odds with Canada's military establishment over the issue of conscription, was unlikely to side with the military in what he perceived as a political matter. Moreover his diary clearly shows that his attitude toward the Japanese as a race was negative. For example there is his comment on the bombing of Hiroshima: "It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe." W.L.M. King Diary, August 6, 1945. St. Laurent was similarly prejudiced against Japanese Canadians. As Prime Minister King noted in his diary St. Laurent wanted to deport Japanese Canadians because they "would increase in population and demands would be made later when Japan was a settled country to have the Japanese in Canada given the same rights as the white population." King Diary, January 27, 1947. Likewise, Mitchell, who thought nothing of calling Japanese Canadians "yellow bastards" in polite company, would later distinguish himself as an ally of Ian Mackenzie in stripping Japanese Canadians of their property and in the attempt to deport them. Sunahara, 140.

[44] J.L. Ralston, Appointment Diary, J.L. Ralston Papers, MG27IIIB11, Vol. 67, P.A.C.

[45] A special sitting on February 24, 1942 at which Parliament was brought up to date on the course of the war and which for security reasons was not recorded in Hansard.

[46] Notes and Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, February 19, 1942, J.L. Ralston Papers, MGIIIB11, Vol. 37, P.A.C. See quote at Sunahara, 43.

DRAFT

FOLDER NO. 7

5 Jan.,1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

C194932

4 Jan. I am enclosing copy of a note from the Deputy Minister of Justice, summarizing the arguments against the validity of the Japanese Orders-in-Council which were submitted yesterday to the Acting Minister of Justice by a Committee headed by Mr.B.K.Sandwell and Mr.F.A.Brewin of Toronto. They ask for a reference to the Supreme Court of the question of the validity of the Order-in-Council authorising the deportation of naturalized Canadians of Japanese origin. As you will see from Mr.Varcoe's commentary, the legal arguments adduced do not seem very formidable. (Incidentally they do not make any reference to the fact that under the procedure contemplated in the Order-in-Council revocation of naturalization is to be simultaneous with or even consequent on the fact of deportation. It seems to me that a legal basis for the Order would have been stronger if revocation had clearly preceded deportation).

The question of whether there should be a reference to the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion is for Cabinet consideration. Mr.Varcoe is inclined to think that such a reference should be made, and has prepared a draft recommendation to Council to this end. If such action is to be taken, it is recommended that the necessary Order-in-Council be considered at the next meeting of Council so that the hearing of the reference may commence by January 21st.

attached I have read F.R.Scott's letter in yesterday's CITIZEN to which you drew my attention. The same letter is published in this morning's GAZETTE. With much of the argument of the letter I have always been in general sympathy. The fact of racial discrimination does underlie our treatment of Japanese Canadians. We have tried to temper it and exclude its ugliest aspects, I think fairly successfully. Native born Canadians of Japanese origin are not to be subject to deportation, and naturalized persons who withdrew their application for repatriation to Japan before the end of hostilities are being permitted to remain in Canada. These points, which were made very plainly in your statement in the House, are overlooked, probably deliberately, in Scott's letter. They are, however, on the record and have been

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

recognized by many people as a real modification of the previous programme. Even with these modifications in mind, however, the fact remains that it has not been feasible to treat the Canadian population of Japanese origin in the same way as say the Canadian population of German or Italian origin have been treated. This fact will always enable the absolutists to charge the Government with countenancing racial discrimination. We do discriminate against the Japanese, against the Chinese, and against the British Indians, in our immigration laws and indirectly in our electoral laws, but until my native province of British Columbia achieves some change of heart, I do not see what we can do about it except strive to limit and lessen the discriminations every time an opportunity offers.

Yours

(NORMAN A. ROBERTSON UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS)

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

J/BC

C19-1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

-- You may wish to see the attached statement which was issued by the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians following the decision of the Supreme Court in the Japanese reference.

-- Also attached are three letters which are typical of the communications that we continue to receive each day. The majority of them are from church organizations, or from persons who have contact with church work. In my memorandum of February 11, concerning the memorandum sent out by the National Inter-church Advisory Committee on the Resettlement of Japanese Canadians, I mentioned that we were receiving "an average of possibly 10 to 15 letters a day protesting against the deportation policy". Since that time the number has somewhat increased. In the last week in February, we were receiving possibly 30 letters a day, though now the number has fallen to about 20 per day. Over the last three-month period we have probably received in the vicinity of 700 to 1000 letters on this subject.

The number received has made it necessary to send a reply only if the letter has special merit or particularly calls for an answer.

R.G.R.

March 4, 1946.

Mr Robertson who has been following this subject closely tells me we almost never receive letters advocating or supporting the deportation policy. Memo on the other side. Sent.

see also CWC Document 164

(RGR = R. G. ROBERTSON - ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
JWP = JACK W PICKERSGILL - ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER)

FOLDER NO. 7

R. G. ROBERTSON

Copie sent to External (2) 2 Dept. Affairs P.C. 1/4/46

MARCH 26 1946

Minute of a Meeting Concerning the Problem of Japanese in Canada. C19-1959

P-30-9 V 4 (B)

W.W.II - Japanese-Canadians

Delegation

1. A meeting was held on Tuesday, March 26, at 11.30 a.m. in the Prime Minister's office in the East Block, to enable the delegation representing the Cooperative Commitee on Japanese Canadians to place their views before a committee of the Cabinet. Those present were:

The Prime Minister
Mr. Ian Mackenzie
Mr. St. Laurent
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Claxton
Mr. Abbott
Mr. Martin
Mr. Heeney
Mr. N.A.Robertson
Mr. R.G.Robertson

and for the Cooperative Committee:

Mr. MacMillan
Mr. Brewin
Mr. Coldwell
Mr. Tarr
Mr. Croll
Mr. Millard.

2. Mr. MacMillan opened for the Cooperative Committee by explaining its background and organization, and the support which it had in various parts of the country. He stated that it also had representatives on it of the Japanese Canadians themselves. He said that the Committee had noted that approximately one-third of the Japanese in Canada had now been settled east of the Rockies and had been fairly well received. They felt that if the present restrictions were removed it would be easier still for the Japanese to settle down and they felt that few of these would wish to return to British Columbia. In the circumstances, the possibility of settlement seemed brighter than it had previously, but the Commitee felt that procedure under the present Orders in Council would not lead to a satisfactory solution. He called on Mr. Brewin to present the details of the Committee's position with regard to the present government policy.

3. Mr. Brewin stated that, while it might seem questionable to raise questions on policy concerning Orders that were at the time under judicial review, nevertheless the Committee was not anxious to proceed with an appeal to a higher body and wanted to set forth considerations which they thought would justify cancellation of the Orders in their entirety. They felt that this would be a feasible policy since any disloyal Japanese could be dealt with under existing legislation.

The particular criticisms which the Committee had to make of the present policy were as follows:

(a) The Orders provided for the exile of Canadian citizens, a policy which had once been followed but which had been in disuse for centuries.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

(b) The Orders violated fundamental rules of international law in that they infringed upon the sovereign rights of another state and, in effect, constituted an invasion of this territory.

(c) The Orders put the value on Canadian citizenship at a discount which was particularly untimely since the Canadian Citizenship Bill was just being discussed in Parliament.

(d) They appeared to be based on racial discrimination.

(e) They were based on emergency needs created by the war which no longer existed in sufficient measure to require the action embodied in the Orders.

(f) The Orders were based on "alleged" requests for repatriation to Japan, which were taken as evidence of disloyalty. The assumption that they indicated disloyalty was strongly questioned by the Committee. They felt that many of the Japanese had not appreciated what was involved and had thought that the government wished them to sign the forms that were presented bearing the government crest. Moreover, in the circumstances in which the people had been placed through their movement from their homes and so forth, they were not in a position to exercise free will properly.

(g) The Orders constituted a threat to minorities in Canada.

(h) The Orders could not be enforced without injustice and inhumanity to certain persons. In some cases, young Japanese would feel forced to go to Japan with their parents in order to care for them.

(i) The policy would create in the Orient a sense of hostility to Canada.

(j) The policy was in contradiction with the commitments in the United Nations Charter.

If the Orders were not rescinded, the Committee felt that, as an alternative, but definitely a second best, all Japanese, subject to deportation, should be given the right of appeal to a judicial committee which could investigate their cases and ascertain whether there was any real disloyalty. Mr. Brewin pointed out that Canadian nationals had a complete right to withdraw their signatures; that the majority decision of the Supreme Court made deportation of Canadian wives and children impossible, and that there would be a certain number of the persons who would be willing to go voluntarily. In the circumstances, a judicial inquiry would not concern too large a group of people.

SUNAHARA, AJIN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

C194962

So far as resettlement was concerned, the Committee urged removal of present restrictions with regard to land purchase and settlement, and thought the government should take more positive action to encourage a readiness to accept Japanese in various communities. They felt that another 8000 Japanese could be settled at an early date without difficulty.

If the Committee's representations were not deemed acceptable by the government, they, at least, asked that the Japanese should be given full and adequate notice before Orders for their movement were issued. This was necessary in order that all legal steps might be taken for the protection of the position of the individuals. Mr. Brewin stated that the Committee, in co-operation with the Council in British Columbia, were determined that everything possible should be done to exercise the full resources of the law in protecting the position of Japanese persons who did not wish to leave the country.

Finally, if the appeal to the Privy Council were not successful, the Committee asked that the matter be referred to Parliament for decision.

4. Mr. Millard said that there had been some objections from some branches of labour at first to the movement of Japanese into new areas, but those had largely died down. In reply to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, he said that he believed that labour would support any policy of resettlement. In addition, Mr. Millard added that they were conscious of the fact that if our discriminatory policy were followed in Canada, there would, undoubtedly, be future repercussions in World Federation of Trade Unions.

5. Mr. Croll said that he felt that important principles were involved in the settlement of the Japanese problem, and he was also of the opinion that it was instrinsically not as great a problem as it had become. It had been magnified in certain respects and he hoped that it would be possible to reduce it to its proper terms in order that the fundamental principles involved would not be overridden.

6. Mr. Mitchell stated that the activities of the Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians would have substantial benefit if they could educate public opinion into an active acceptance of Japanese into various communities. The resettlement required the co-operation of individuals, municipalities and provinces.

So far as requests for repatriation were concerned, Mr. Mitchell stated categorically, that no coercion or pressure of any type had been used. This was substantiated by the International Red Cross in its report.

7. Mr. St. Laurent pointed out that what was contemplated under the Orders in Council was a change in method rather than in principle. The Naturalization Act provided for the cancellation of naturalization certificates in cases where the recipients were found, upon inquiry, to be "disaffected". The ordinary procedure for inquiry, which was provided, was suitable for normal times, but this was an aggravated problem which required extraordinary provisions. The government had taken the view that any person who took the very serious step of signing a declaration of desire to go to Japan during time of war was, in reality, "disaffected".

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

C19-1963

Mr. St. Laurent also pointed out that the problem of resettlement was an important one. Under the urgency of moving people during the war, the government had entered into commitments with certain provinces to remove the Japanese who were moved into them immediately upon the termination of hostilities. These undertakings had to be carried out unless the provinces released the Dominion from its obligations.

8. The Prime Minister said that a further point the government had to consider was the obligation they had to the families of men who had been killed in the Far East, particularly in the prison camps in Hong Kong. At the time that these men were being killed, many of the Japanese had indicated a desire to go to Japan. He did not, himself, see how a person could sign such a declaration of desire if he did not believe that Japan was going to win the war. Mr. King pointed out that if it had not been for the atomic bomb we would, undoubtedly, still be fighting Japan and more Canadians would be killed constantly. The families of all these men had to be considered in any action that was taken.

9. Mr. Coldwell said that he thought it would be most regrettable if any policy were carried through which looked as if it were based on discrimination with regard to colour or race. In the present state of the world, and with the great amount of distrust and suspicion so prevalent at the present, its effect would be very bad.

10. Mr. Mackenzie stated that so far as the feeling of British Columbia was concerned, he felt that the people there were strongly of the opinion that the Japanese should not be allowed to settle again on the Coast. Their feeling was not racial, although, in part, it was economic in origin. In addition, however, there was a feeling that not only had the Japanese forced white fishermen out of the fishing industry, but they had used their fishing licenses and their work as an opportunity to map the coast of British Columbia to the advantage of the Japanese government.

11. The Prime Minister closed the meeting by assuring the delegation that the views which they had presented would be given careful consideration.

R. G. Robertson

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

St.Laurent fought strongly and bravely for deporting practically all who could be deported, including some Canadian citisens, of those who had signed during the war wishing to return on the score they would increase in population and demands would be made later when Japan was a settled country to have the Japanese in Canada given the same rights as the white population He has in mind the issue being raised at the United Nations. That they would never really work into Canadian life and their numbers might become troublesome. On the other hand there was the feeling which I helped to express that the war was over people were now trying to foster good-will and peace. That we will be looked upon almost as inhuman and that it would be a crime to send back to Japan those who had behaved themselves well throughout the whole period of the war. Had nothing against them except what they claim was duress. They had asked to be sent back. Thaere was practically unanimity in demanding cessation of deportation. 4000 have already gone. There would not be ships available for some time. It might take another six months to get another 4000 away. Meanwhile the Civil Liberties League would begin stimulating opinion. We already as a Liberal party were in a false position in the minds of many people through out ill-Liberal treatment of different persons. We would probably raise a real issue if we sought to oppose what now seemed to be general public opinion in the matter of dropping the question of deportation, though holding the right to control the movement of the Japs in Canada for some time to come. This for reasons of maintaining law and order, etc. B.C. has changed its attitude considerably. Men like Buchanan, in Alberta, claim the Japs are needed for the beet sugar industry. Mitchell claims the whole industry would have suffered but for their help. Council finally decided to accept the report of the Committee of the Cabinet and repeal the order of deportation. Let the Civil Liberties League stay at home, St. Laurent said.

Mackenzie, who will have most to lose, said he thought they had better make the decision unanimous, not because they were not right in their view, which St.Laurent had expressed, but because they felt sure that they would not be able to get support to carry it out. I had pointed this out very strongly that we had better meet each situation as it arises. Take the one today, the only one that we could really hope to get successfully through Parliament and which, on humanitarian grounds, is right.

The next discussion was on old age pensions, what was best to do. It was agreed by all we would have to implement in the form of legislation arrangements made under order in council. Martin had suggested increasing the amount of the pension and raising the minimum allowed by way of income, the federal government to continue to pay 76% to the provinces for all who

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

COPY

Document JAP 5

EAD/CM

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CANADA

Ottawa April 1, 1947

152189
Your File No. J-175

The Royal Commission

Cabinet Document JAP 5, F.P. Varcoe, Deputy Minister of Justice, to Dr. E.H. Coleman, Under-Secretary of State, January 1, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, Vol. 34, file 2201, P.A.C.

Memorandum, Secretary of State to the Special Cabinet Committee on Claims by Japanese Evacuees, March 27, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 34, File 2201, P.A.C.

These two documents illustrate the manner in which the federal government sought to minimize the mandate of the Royal Commission in order to minimize criticism of the policies that produced the economic losses being compensated.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

COPY

Document JAP 5

EAD/CM

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CANADA

Ottawa April 1, 1947

152189
Your File No. J-175

I have been asked to prepare a draft Report to Council for the appointment of a Commissioner under the Inquiries Act to investigate claims made by persons of the Japanese race in respect of the disposition of their property and also in respect of claims for loss resulting from their evacuation from the protected areas of British Columbia.

I understand that as a matter of policy the Government has not yet decided upon the types of claims that will be admitted; I have, therefore, set out in the schedule the complete list of claims. The schedule can then be amended in accordance with Government decisions on policy.

Encl.

"F. P. Varcoe"

Deputy Minister

The Under Secretary of State

O T T A W A

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

Canadians[47] suggests that he agreed with his military subordinates that the forced removal of Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast was a political policy not a national security policy.

Given that national security was only an excuse for the actions of the goverment and not the true cause, why were Japanese Canadians uprooted from their homes and incarcerated in detention camps? Apologists have suggested that it was done to protect Japanese Canadians from the public of British Columbia, an explanation that smears the character of British Columbian society intimating that it was violent and lawless in 1942. More importantly the "protective custody" explanation is inconsistant with how Japanese Canadians were treated. If Japanese Canadians required protection why were *all* Japanese Canadians moved including those living isolated from the white population and hence out of danger, and those whose neighbours had indicated to the government that they would protect them? If "protective custody" was the objective then why were thousands of Japanese Canadians were confined for up to nine months in the stinking Livestock Barns of what is now the Pacific Exhibition Grounds in Vancouver where they afforded a concentrated target for whites who might want to attack them. Why were the men separated from their families and shipped to road camps leaving the women, the children and the aged behind, easy targets for the alleged hostile mobs? If the British Columbian populace was likely to be whipped into violent disorder by racist demagogues, why was nothing done to silence those few agitators rather than uprooting 20,000 innocent people, 17,000 of them Canadians? If the object was to maintain public order on the Pacific coast, why was it necessary to revoke the civil liberties of the potential *victims* of disorder and to continue to restrict their civil liberties for seven years, four years after the end of the Pacific war and long after the racist rabblerousers had fallen silent? Finally if the purpose of the government was to protect Japanese Canadians why did Ian Mackenzie and his colleagues not stop with a temporary incarceration of Japanese Canadians? Why did they immediately begin to set in motion a process that would strip Japanese Canadians of their possessions, impoverishing most? Why did they try to deport 10,000 innocent people? If indeed the real motive behind the order uprooting Japanese Canadians was not a crass attempt to effect a political objective but a misguided

---

[47]Canada, War Cabinet Committee, **Minutes**, February 26, 1942, RG 2/16, vol. 8, P.A.C.

DRAFT

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

COPY

OTTAWA , April , 1947

TO HIS EXCELLENCY

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

The undersigned has the honour to report as follows:

That during the war persons of the Japanese race were evacuated from the protected areas of British Columbia and by Order in Council P.C. 1665 of March 4, 1942, as amended by Order in Council P.C. 2483 of March 27, 1942, it was provided that all property situated in any protected area of British Columbia belonging to any person of the Japanese race (except fishing vessels subject to Order in Council P.C. 288 of January 13, 1942, hereinafter referred to, and deposits of money, shares of stock, debentures, bonds or other securities) delivered up to any person by the owner pursuant to an Order of the Minister of Justice or which was turned over to the Custodian by or on behalf of the owner, or which the owner on being evacuated from the protected area, was unable to take with him, should be vested in and subject to the control and management of the Custodian as defined in the Regulations respecting Trading with the Enemy.

That by Order in Council P.C. 469 of January 19, 1943, it was provided that whenever the Custodian had been vested with the power and responsibility of controlling and managing any property of persons of the Japanese race evacuated from the said protected areas, such power and responsibility should be deemed to include and to have included from the date of the vesting of such property in the Custodian, the power to liquidate, sell or otherwise dispose of such property.

That during the war fishing vessels belonging to persons of the Japanese race were impounded and by Order in Council P.C. 288 of January 13, 1942, a committee on the disposal/

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

disposal of Japanese fishing vessels was established and was empowered, inter alia, to make such arrangements as would make it possible for the owners of such detained vessels freely to negotiate for sales of such vessels.

That pursuant to the above mentioned Orders real and personal property of persons of the Japanese race was disposed of and claims have been made by persons of the Japanese race that they have suffered pecuniary loss by reason of such disposition of their property and also by reason of their evacuation from the protected areas of British Columbia.

That it is deemed advisable to appoint a Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act to investigate the said claims and to make recommendations with respect thereto.

The undersigned, therefore, has the honour to recommend:

1. That the Honourable . . . . . be appointed a Commissioner pursuant to the Inquiries Act, chapter ninety-nine of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, to inquire into the claims set out in the Schedule hereto of persons of the Japanese race for pecuniary loss sustained by them by reason of their evacuation from the protected areas of British Columbia and the management and disposition of their real and personal property and to report his findings to the Governor in Council.

2. That the Commissioner shall examine into each claim and make a report to the Governor in Council advising as to the amount of compensation that in his opinion would be fair and reasonable.

3. That the Commissioner shall give public notice in such manner as he deems advisable of the time for the filing of claims and for the hearing of evidence and that all claims shall be in writing, verified by statutory declaration and filed in the office of the Custodian at Vancouver, British Columbia.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

4. That the Commissioner be authorized to engage the services of such counsel, technical advisers or other experts, clerks, reporters and assistants as he may deem necessary or advisable.

5. That the expenses of and incidental to the said inquiry be paid out of moneys appropriated by Parliament.

SCHEDULE

1. Claims that any real or personal property was sold pursuant to the Orders hereinbefore referred to at a price less than the market value thereof at the time of sale.

2. Claims that any real or personal property was sold pursuant to the Orders hereinbefore referred to at a price less than the market value thereof at the time of the evacuation of the owner.

3. Claims for compensation for loss of revenue by reason of the sale pursuant to the Orders hereinbefore referred to of revenue-producing real or personal property.

4. Claims for compensation for loss of real or personal property by theft while such property was under the control and management of

   (a) the Custodian, or

   (b) a person appointed by the owner to control and manage such property.

5. Claims for loss of life insurance policies by reason of failure to pay premiums directly attributable to the evacuation of the policyholder.

6. Claims for loss of income directly attributable to the evacuation.

Respectfully submitted,

Secretary of State.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

March 27, 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE SPECIAL CABINET COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS BY JAPANESE EVACUEES

The type of claim in which the Custodian is particularly interested relates to the liquidation of real and personal property left in the Protected Area of British Columbia. Representations made indicate that the Japanese claimants feel that the losses they incurred went far beyond this. By reason of evacuation they were required to surrender their businesses and the positions in which they were employed and generally speaking, their chances of earning a livelihood were cut off. All such claims are based upon the economic loss caused by the results of evacuation. Unless the enquiry is strictly confined to claims of the nature mentioned in the Prime Minister's announcement of January 24, 1947, it is reasonable to suggest that claims put forward will go beyond those referred to in the statement. In support of this, I attach copy of a Questionnaire which, I understand, is being used by the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy in their survey.

Apart from demands for compensation covering economical and personal property losses, claims may be made in regard to parcels of real estate which the Custodian advertised and sold on the basis of valuation and with the approval of the Advisory Committees.

At a meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee on Claims by Japanese Evacuees held in the Privy Council Chamber on Monday, March 24,1947, it was agreed that it would be advisable to appoint a Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act to recommend the amount, if any, which, in his opinion, should be granted to any Japanese claimant.

The following are matters to be considered in reaching decisions as to the scope of such inquiry:

1. Real Estate - The difference between the sale price and fair market value. It is altogether likely that the Japanese idea of value will not coincide with the market value, but in my opinion, a properly established market value should be the only basis for claim in this connection.

The inquiry should be on the basis set out in Section 47 of the Exchequer Court Act, as follows:

"47. The Court, in determining the amount to be paid to any claimant for any land or property taken for the purpose of any public work, or for injury done

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

to any land or property, shall estimate or assess the value or amount thereof at the time when the land or property was taken, or the injury complained of was occasioned".

Is this the understanding as to the scope of the inquiry?

2. Real Estate Depreciation - The possibility of the market value having decreased at the time of sale due to depreciation of the property after the Japanese were evacuated.

This would apply chiefly to rural properties and possibly occurred in connection with the Fraser Valley Fruit Farms. It should be noted that the appraisal of these lands was, I believe, made in June of 1942, so that there would not have been an exceptionally long period in which depreciation would have taken place insofar as the actual land and buildings were concerned. Greenhouses quickly fall into disrepair and quite a disparity exists between the Japanese valuation and the amount at which some of this property has been sold.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to review claims arising out of depreciation?

3. Real Estate - Loss of Revenue - Some claims in connection with real estate may be based on the fact that after evacuation, the properties were leased and the income was more than sufficient to carry the overhead and this income was cut off by the sale of the property. The Japanese may claim that they were compelled to expend the capital derived from the liquidation of real estate in order to maintain their families in the Housing Centres and elsewhere.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to review claims falling within this category?

4. Chattels - The difference between the sale price and the market value of the goods actually sold. There are cases where losses were sustained by those who were operating businesses such as stores, dry cleaning plants, garages, shingle and rice mills, drug stores and rooming operations. In a number of cases, stock in trade, plant machinery and equipment were sold by the Custodian on the basis of valuation, but the matter of goodwill or the revenue bearing possibilities of these operations were lost to the Japanese. In addition to this, where the real estate did not belong to the owner of these types of busi-

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

nesses, dismantling, removing and re-assembling costs entered into the price which the purchaser was prepared to pay for such chattels and equipment.

Certain types of equipment in use by the Japanese were definitely old-fashioned and while capable of producing revenue in the hands of the Japanese, did not have a sale value equivalent to the Japanese idea of its worth.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to revies claims of this type?

5. Chattels - The Market value of goods unaccounted for because of loss by theft, depreciation, while in storage warehouses which belonged to the Custodian. This not only concerns household effects, but a certain amount of equipment, the main item of which is most probably that of fishing tackle. The matter to be considered is whether, the Custodian having exercised all reasonable care, there is any responsibility on the Government for shortages which have occurred for the reasons above mentioned.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to entertain such claims?

6. Chattels - The market value of goods unaccounted for because of loss by theft, depreciation, while in storage and under the control of Agents appointed by the Japanese.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to review claims for loss occasioned as aforesaid?

7. Fishing Vessels - These are referred to (Item 6) in the attached copy of the Questionnaire. In connection with fishing vessels, approximately 90% of these sales were negotiated by the Japanese themselves through the Japanese Fishing Vessels disposal Committee. The boats which were sold by the Custodian were of the poorest type and dissatisfaction has been expressed in some cases in regard to the prices obtained.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to consider claims in respect to sales both by the Japanese Fishing Vessels Disposal Committee and the relatively small number of sales effected by the Custodian after the Fishing Vessels Disposal Committee had been disbanded?

8. Motor Vehicles - Automobiles are referred to (Item 7) in the Questionnaire, copy of which is attached. Complaints have been very considerable in regard to the prices obtained for cars and trucks.

By Government Notice, dated February 26, 1942, the Minister of Justice ordered the Japanese to deliver up motor vehicles, cameras, radios and

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

firearms to the R.C.M.P., and a notice was published in the press requiring surrender by March 9, 1942. In the interval, many Japanese disposed of their cars at very low prices or by turning them over to friends. It was the opinion of the British Columbia Security Commission that it would not be desirable for Evacuees to be permitted to take their cars out of the Protected Area and as the majority of vehicles were stored at Hastings Park, not under cover, it was considered that due to rapid depreciation, liquidation was necessary. Independent appraisals were obtained on all vehicles and tenders equal to or in excess of the appraised price were accepted. It should be noted that these cars were sold at what was probably the poorest market in used car history. Apart from the Japanese vehicles, all used car dealers were heavily stocked and gasoline and tire shortages created a near panic situation and prices were cut as much as 50% on stocks in the hands of used car dealers.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to review claims within this category?

9. Life Insurance - There have been complaints that life insurance policies have had to be surrendered for cash value or allowed to lapse owing to insufficient earnings by the Japanese.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to entertain this type of claim?

10. Economic Losses - These are referred to in the attached copy of Questionnaire (Items 9 and 10). Due to war conditions, economic loss has been sustained by many citizens altogether apart from nationality and without the factor of evacuation. Business operations were curtailed in many instances due to lack of supplies, to say nothing of the economic disruption caused by enlistment in the forces, sometimes resulting in the supreme sacrifice of life itself. If consideration were to be given to the question of economic loss caused by evacuation, and such loss could be accurately established, this would not, in my opinion, of necessity be a justifiable claim.

Should the Commissioner be empowered to entertain claims coming within this category?

Reference has been made to the fact that a Commissioner should be appointed to consider the Japanese claims and in my opinion the Commissioner so appointed should be a person who holds, or has held, judicial office.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

When the matter of the type of claims to which consideration should be given is determined, I recommend that advertisements be inserted in numerous newspapers, including The New Canadian, calling upon the Japanese to file their claims, duly verified, and to address all such claims to the Office of the Custodian, 506 Royal Bank Building, Vancouver, B. C. This will afford the officials in the Custodian's Vancouver Office an opportunity to review files and assemble data which will be helpful to the Commission. A time limit should be fixed for the filing of such claims.

I am informed that the distribution of Japanese in Canada at November 30, 1946, was as follows:

British Columbia	6,981
Alberta	4,262
Saskatchewan	503
Manitoba	1,193
Ontario	6,617
Quebec	1,210
Nova Scotia	1
New Brunswick	10
Prince Edward Island	6
Yukon and Northwest Territories	31
Total	20,814

Representatives of the Japanese have indicated that they desire to be heard in centres of the different provinces, but I am of opinion that it should be left to the Commissioner to determine where such hearings are to take place.

It is very probable that thousands of claims will be filed, but very improbable that the vast majority could be substantiated in a Court of Law. The Japanese have inflated ideas as to the value of their assets and doubtless their claims will be grossly exaggerated.

It is very difficult to estimate the amount that will be required to meet the claims and defer the expenses of the Commission. At all events, it appears necessary to insert an item in the supplementary estimates in order to provide funds.

Secretary of State

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

COPY

MEMORANDUM

Re: Request for the issuance of licenses to British subjects of other than white or native origin in the Northwest Territories.

While it had been fairly well known for a number of years that there were considerable fisheries resources in Great Slave Lake in the Northwest Territories the fisheries there had not been exploited on account of the transportation difficulties and the availability closer to market of adequate fish supplies.

Postwar Restrictions on Japanese Canadians

Memorandum, Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, to the Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, October 24, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 34, File 2201, P.A.C.

J.L. Ilsley, Secretary of State, to Raymond Ranger, Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, November 18, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 34, File 2201, P.A.C.

Memorandum Re Japanese Orders Under Transitional Measures Act, J.W. Pickersgill, Assistant to the Prime Minister, to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, February 12, 1948, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, File 2965, C195016 – 195018, P.A.C.

These documents illustrate in the first example, the tenaciousness of prewar racism in the Fisheries Department; in the second example, the willingness of newer Cabinet ministers to change those policies; in the third example, the continuing tendancy to analyse Japanese Canadian policy under separate headings of "political considerations" and "considerations of justice".

FOLDER NO. 7

COPY

MEMORANDUM

Re: Request for the issuance of licenses to British subjects of other than white or native origin in the Northwest Territories.

While it had been fairly well known for a number of years that there were considerable fisheries resources in Great Slave Lake in the Northwest Territories the fisheries there had not been exploited on account of the transportation difficulties and the availability closer to market of adequate fish supplies.

Following investigations by the Fisheries Research Board confirming the fact that fish exist in commercialy quantity, the McInnes Products Limited of Edmonton, Alberta, undertook operations in Great Slave Lake on a considerable scale in 1945 and have been operating there each season since that time. It may be added that the regulations permit the taking up to two and one half million pounds of whitefish and trout and one million pounds in the winter on the understanding that any portion of the summer limitation not taken may be added to the winter limitation. Summer operations have been carried on with headquarters at Gros Cap while winter operations are carried on in the Hay River area of the Lake.

The Company has been utilizing as packers, scalers, etc., a number of Canadian citizens of Japanese origin who had, prior to the war, been engaged in fishing in British Columbia. They have not, however, been carrying on any fishing operations which requires licensing.

When the Department's Chief Inspector of Fisheries at Winnipeg, who is responsible for administration in the Northwest Territories, visited that area recently, he was interviewed by a spokesman for a group of Canadian-born Japanese, a Mr. Tak Shikatani. Mr. Shikatani advised the Chief Inspector that from eight to ten Canadian-born Japanese with previous fishing experience in British Columbia would likely take advantage of any concession granted by the Department with respect to commercial fishing licenses.

By Order in Council of January 13th, 1942, P.C. 251, which was enacted under the authority of the then War Measures Act provided that no licenses should be issued to persons of Japanese racial origin and that such persons shall not be

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7



NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

paternalistic desire to protect Japanese Canadians, then that motive was soundly perverted by the Ministers placed in charge of Japanese Canadian policy, Ian Mackenzie and Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of Labour.

Dispossession

The process of stripping Japanese Canadians of their property by means of P.C. 469[48] began only seven weeks after P.C. 1486 authorized their uprooting. Recognizing that Japanese farms in the Frazer Valley were ideal for postwar veteran resettlement[49], Mackenzie immediately took steps to acquire them. By confiscating Japanese Canadian farms Mackenzie could satisfy two political objectives: make an appeal for veteran's votes with good, cheap farms, and give early proof to his pledge of April 4, 1942 that as long as he remained in public office Japanese Canadians would never return to the Pacific coast[50]. His plans went smoothly. Since the Veterans Land Act under which he intended to buy the farms was not yet law he arranged for the sale of Japanese-owned farms to be frozen[51], had them surveyed by Soldier Settlement Board appraisers using criteria which minimized their apparent value[52], and persuaded the Secretary of State, Norman A. McLarty, to amend the powers of the Custodian of Enemy Property to permit the sale of Japanese property[53]. Mackenzie was assisted by Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of Labour. Mitchell supported the sale of Japanese Canadian property as a means of raising money on which the incarcerated Japanese could support themselves. It was government policy that Japanese Canadians confined in the government's detention camps should deplete their own savings before receiving government support. In addition Mitchell wanted to use the proceeds from the sale of property owned by Japanese Canadians to reimburse the

---

[48] January 19, 1943.
[49] Ian Mackenzie to T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, April 14, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 25, 70-25-3, PAC.
[50] Vancouver **Province**, April 4, 1942.
[51] P.C. 5523, June 29, 1942. That order required that sales of Japanese farms be approved by the Director of the Soldier Settlement Board ostensibly to protect Japanese Canadians from exploitation. Approval was seldom given by that official who in August became the Director of the Veteran's Land Act Administration and purchaser of the farms on behalf of the government.
[52] Sunahara, p. 103. See also Exhibits 60 and 96, Royal Commission to Investigate the Complaints of Canadian Citizens of Japanese Origin (Bird Commission) Papers, RG 33/69 Vol. 78, P.A.C.
[53] Japanese property had been vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property "as a protective measure only" at the time of the uprooting. P.C. 1665, March 4, 1942, s. 12.

DRAFT

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

permitted to serve on fishing vessels. This applied to British Columbia only and still continues under the special legislation of last Session.

Prior to the war the number of licenses to persons of other than white or native origin in British Columbia was restricted and the endeavour was that through the years they would be gradually reduced. This restriction was put into effect through the absolute discretion to the Minister by Section 7 of the Fisheries Act to issue or authorize to be issued leases and licenses for fisheries and/or fishing.

On account of their frugal means of living and their acceptance of long hours of work together with their fishing ability, fishermen of Japanese origin would likely make it impossible for white fishermen to compete with them if licensing privileges are granted.

At least so long as the prohibition exists on the Pacific Coast it would, in this Department's opinion, be of doubtful wisdom to grant licenses to such persons in other provinces than British Columbia.

Ottawa, Ontario,
September 24, 1947.

Stewart Bates,
Deputy Minister of Fisheries.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

CANADIAN DELEGATION

DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA

The Biltmore,
New York City,
18th November, 1947.

SECRET

Dear Mr. Ranger,-

I have your letter of November 14th, enclosing copy of a memorandum regarding the request for the issuance of fishing licenses to British subjects of other than white or native origin in the Northwest Territories.

The suggestion in the last paragraph of Mr. Bates' memorandum would appear to be reasonable, namely that as long as the prohibition exists on the Pacific Coast the same prohibition should exist in other provinces. However, I feel that within a reasonable time the prohibition will have to be abolished, both on the Pacific Coast and in the other Provinces, as a prohibition based on racial grounds is not defensible, having in mind the principles to which Canada has subscribed as a member of the United Nations.

Yours very truly,

Raymond Ranger, Esq.,
Secretary,
Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions,
Privy Council,
O t t a w a, Canada.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Confidential

C195016

Re: Japanese orders under Transitional Measures Act.

The attached letter from Mr. Senior seems to me full of good sense. There are presumably two considerations of which account should be taken in deciding on this matter:

1. Political considerations,
2. Considerations of Justice.

Political considerations

It is argued that opinion in Vancouver is still hostile to the repeal of the orders. There is soon to be a by-election. Why not leave things alone until the election is over?

That might be a sound position if things could be left alone, but they cannot.

When the new Bill is introduced the C.C.F. will bring forward an amendment. It will be easy to devise an amendment that is in order.

To vote for the continuance of the orders will be acutely embarrassing politically to almost all Liberal Members from Manitoba and Ontario, and probably to many from Quebec and the Maritimes. (The influence of the Winnipeg Free Press and its satellites, the Toronto Star

FOLDER NO. 7

C195017

and Saturday Night, to say nothing of the Churches, will all be on one side).

What about B.C.?

The attitude there has changed greatly, as the recent outcry against the action of the provincial government showed. Probably some so-called Liberals might vote Tory in the by-election. But everyone agrees it is the C.C.F. and not the Tories who are the threat in Vancouver. And it might well prove that many genuine Liberal votes would be thrown to the C.C.F. on a fundamental issue like this.

Moreover, everyone knows the orders must be repealed sooner or later. If action were taken now, the effect on the anti-Japanese sentiment would probably be largely gone by the time of the by-election, whereas those who feel fundamental Liberal principles have been betrayed are not so likely to forget.

Considerations of Justice

The original action in interfering with the rights of Canadian citizens exclusively because of their race could only be justified by the acute character of the war time emergency. No one can argue that the emergency still exists in this field. The only possible justification

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

C195018

for continuing the orders is expediency. They are a flagrant violation of nearly every fundamental Liberal principle and deeply obnoxious to hundreds and, indeed, thousands of the best Liberals in the country.

Therefore, it would seem that, while there may be arguments of a political character on both sides, even there the weight seems on the side of repeal. On grounds of justice and on the basis of fidelity to Liberal principles, there is only one side to the question.

12.ii.48

(Letter of C.N. SENIOR TO KING, FEB. 7, 1948 filed separately)
JC.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

government for support payments it had already provided.[54] By selling Japanese Canadian property and making Japanese Canadians pay for their own incarceration the government could defuse charges by the Conservative opposition that the government was "pampering" Japanese Canadians[55].

Again it is doubtful that Mackenzie and Mitchell disclosed their real motives to the whole Cabinet. Rather P.C. 469 states that the Custodian's powers were being amended to enable him to handle the continuing sale of Japanese Canadian fishing vessels[56], and to assume the former duties of the Soldier Settlement Board with respect to the farms owned by displaced Japanese Canadians[57]. The assumption of these duties, the order continues, made it "necessary to provide facilities for liquidation of property in appropriate cases." Accordingly the powers of the Custodian were deemed to have included from the date of the vesting of Japanese property "the power to liquidate, sell or otherwise dispose of such property" and that for the purpose of such sales the Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading With the Enemy would apply "as if the property belonged to an enemy"[58].

In fact the words "appropriate cases" meant "every case". Over the objections of those within the civil service who found the escalating abuse of Japanese Canadians "unjustifiable on any basis of decency or humanity,"[59] the federal government, through the Office of the Custodian of Enemy Property, liquidated all real and personal property within 100 miles of the Pacific coast owned by persons of the Japanese race, including that owned by Canadians. Over the next four years, while the courts reserved judgement on the legality of the order[60], an estimated $11.5 million of Japanese Canadian property was

DRAFT

---

[54] T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, to N.A. McLarty, Secretary of State, November 30, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 25, file 70-25(c), P.A.C.
[55] Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, **Minutes**, January 11, 1943, Ian Mackenzie Papers, Vol. 24, P.A.C. This policy reduced government expenses on Japanese Canadians to $700. per year per family of 5. The U.S. government spent $10,000 per year per family of five.
[56] The sale of the fishing fleet had formerly been handled by the Japanese Fishing Vessel Disposal Committee set up under P.C. 288, January 13, 1942.
[57] See note zzz.
[58] P.C. 469, January 19, 1943, s. 2.
[59] Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to N.A. Robertson, July 16, 1943, External Affairs Files, 3464-B-40-C, E.A.A. For specific objections to the policy of stripping Japanese Canadians of their property see Henry F. Angus to N.A. Robertson and Henry F. Angus to W.L.M. King, March 15, 1943, External Affairs file 3464-R-40, E.A.A.
[60] **Nakashima et al** v. **The King** [1947] Ex.C.R. 486.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

sold off for $5,373,317.64[61].

The Japanese Canadians whose property had been confiscated, however, received only a portion of that five million dollars. Only the residue remaining after the deduction of the expenses of the sales, handling and storage charges and administrative fees, and the repayment of any relief benefits accepted by the owner or his family to survive their uprooting and incarceration, was deposited with the Custodian of Enemy Property, who paid no interest. As long as the displaced Japanese remained confined in the government's detention camps they could not receive their capital on deposit with the Custodian of Enemy Property unless they were unemployed, as 50 % of family heads in the detention camps were, or were unable to support their families on the meager wages paid for the few jobs that were available. In that case camp inmates were required to expend their capital on deposit with the Custodian on the necessities of life before receiving any further assistance. [62] It should be noted that neither prisoners of war nor enemy nationals interned under the Geneva Convention are required to support themselves while incarcerated. If the former owners of confiscated property moved east of the Rocky Mountains they could receive their capital assets – less a "substantial back log"[63] retained by the Custodian in case it was decided that they were to be deported – but they could not use those assets to permanently re-establish themselves by purchasing land or a business since persons of the Japanese race, including Canadians, were not permited to buy or lease land. [64] The net result of paying for their own incarceration, for most inmates of the detention camps, was poverty.

The legal action launched by Japanese Canadians to halt the sale of their property illustrates the unfettered powers and potential for abuse of the War Measures Act. There was no national security reason to strip Japanese Canadians of their property. Neither the

---

[61]Estimated by the the Office of the Custodian of Enemy Property. G.W. MacPherson to Dr. E. H. Coleman, January 19, 1943, RG117, Vol T95, P.A.C.. Cash realization from as of March 31, 1947 from Memorandum to Cabinet, Ian Mackenzie Papers, Vol. 79, P.A.C.
[62]Minute of an interdepartmental meeting on the Japanese question, June 30, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-B-40(2), E.A.A.
[63]Ibid, paragraph II(c)
[64]P.C. 1457, February 24, 1942. Land could be purchased or leased with the permission of the Minister of Justice but only 56 such permits were issued by him between 1942 and 1945. See Note for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 12, 1943, External Affairs File 4606-C-13-40, E.A.A. for the policy considerations and Department of Labour Papers, RG27, Vol. 642, File 23-2-2-12-1 P.A.C. for the permits. This restriction was not removed until P.C. 270, January 23, 1947.

DRAFT

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

military nor the R.C.M.P. had requested that Japanese Canadians be deprived of their property.[65] The ownership of property by Japanese Canadians was irrelevant to the peace, order and good government of Canada. Yet the Court upheld P.C. 469 as a necessary war measure solely because it had been passed in time of war and had been deemed necessary by the Governor in Council. Once those preconditions have been met, J.T. Thorson, President of the Exchequer Court[66] held, "the Court has no right to question the decision of the Governor in Council as to the necessity or advisability of the measure."[67] Branded as traitors, forced from their homes, herded into detention camps and stripped of all they owned, there was no way in law that Japanese Canadians could stop Ian Mackenzie and his associates.

Deportation

The circumstances surrounding P.C. 7355[68], authorizing the deportation of 10,000 Japanese Canadians, illustrate the real powerlessness of Parliament when the War Measures Act is administered by an Executive determined to get its way. The first and more draconian version of this order was presented on September 2, 1945 to a Special Cabinet Committee[69] dominated by Ian Mackenzie and Humphrey Mitchell. Their intention was to have that committee rubber-stamp the order and its companions, to rush them through Cabinet and to deport 10,000 Japanese Canadians before the War Measures Act was replaced four months later by the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act of 1945 (N.E.P.T.A.)[70]. However, opposition from within the committee, plus a delay in the necessary approval of the Supreme Allied Commander in Occupied Japan for the shipment of civilians to that starving country, frustrated their plans.

DRAFT

---

[65]H.F. Angus to N.A. Robertson, March 15, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-R-40, paragraph 4, E.A.A.
[66]formerly Minister of National War Services in the Cabinet that uprooted Japanese Canadians.
[67]**Nakashima et al. v. The King** [1947] Ex. C. R. 486 at 501.
[68]December 15, 1945. P.C. 7355 was the cornerstone of a trilogy of orders in council intended to (i) effect the deportation of 10,000 Japanese Canadians (P.C. 7355), (ii) to strip naturalized Japanese Canadians so deported of their Canadian status (P.C. 7356) and (iii) to set up a Loyalty Commission to determine which additional Japanese Canadians the Minister of Labour should recommend for deportation (P.C. 7357).
[69]on Repatriation and Relocation. See Sunahara, p. 124 for composition.
[70]S.C. 9 & 10 George 6, c. 25. The purpose of N.E.P.T.A., about to be put before Parliament, was to continue certain emergency powers, in particular economic controls, to facilitate the transition of the Canadian economy from strict wartime controls to normal peacetime conditions.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

The manner in which this setback was overcome illustrates the acumen and arrogance with which Mackenzie and his allies viewed their emergency powers. First they attempted to expand the Cabinet's powers under N.E.P.T.A. by inserting a clause in the draft bill that gave the Governor in Council exclusive power over "entry into Canada, exclusion and deportation, and revocation of nationality"[71]. The ensuing uproar in Parliament, assisted by the fact that the deportation of citizens had been declared a war crime by the United Nations, forced the Justice Minister, Louis St. Laurent, to withdraw the offensive section, pledging as he did so to consult Parliament on any future deportation legislation[72].

Unfortunately in its relief over the removal of that section and bolstered by St. Laurent's pledge, the Commons failed to appreciate the significance of N.E.P.T.A.'s section 4. Section 4 authorized the Governor in Council to order the continuation in full force under the authority of N.E.P.T.A. of all orders in council passed under the War Measures Act still existing on December 31, 1945. Orders passed under the War Measures Act and continued under the authority of N.E.P.T.A., however, could not be annuled by Parliament as orders passed pursuant to N.E.P.T.A. could be. [73] To defy Parliament with impunity the Cabinet simply waited until N.E.P.T.A. was passed by Parliament. Then in the dying days of the War Measures Act it ordered the deportation of 10,000 Japanese Canadians.

DRAFT

The order in council[74] continuing all existing orders rendered Parliament impotent. Despite the subsequent conclusion of the Chief Justice of Canada that "Parliament has not effaced itself, and has full power to amend or repeal the *War Measures Act* or to make ineffective any Order in Council passed in pursuance of its provisions"[75], there was only one mechanism by which Parliament could "make ineffective" an order it had rejected: it could bring down the government. In December of 1945, however, the probable success of a vote of want of confidence was minimal. Not only did the recently re-elected government have a majority which could be depended upon to support the party, but the Conservative Members from British Columbia, who were as traditionally anti-Asian as their Liberal counterparts, were not about to see themselves accused of precipitating an

---

[71]Bill 15, October 5, 1945, s. 3(g).
[72]**Debates**, December 6, 1945.
[73]N.E.P.T.A. contained a negative resolution section, s. 2(3), which permitted Parliament to annul orders in council by a majority vote.
[74]P.C. 7417, December 28, 1945
[75] **Reference as to the Validity of Orders in Council of the 15th Day of December 1945, in Relation to Persons of the Japanese Race** [1946] S.C.R. 248, Rinfret C.J. at 264. (Hereafter **Reference re Japanese Canadians**)

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

election through supporting the rights of Japanese Canadians.

Again the question arises as to whether the Cabinet as a whole was aware of all the facts behind the deportation issue. P.C. 7355 states as the reason for its existence the fact that certain Japanese Canadians have made "a written request or statement of desire to be repatriated or sent to Japan" and hence that it was deemed desireable to deport them. The order gave the impression, later presumed by the courts[76], that the government was merely trying to facilitate the journey to Japan of those who had *voluntarily* requested to be sent there. The government's own records show how erroneous, in fact, that impression was.

The "written request or statement of desire" referred to above, in most cases, was document signed in the course of a "loyalty survey" in April and May, 1945, a survey designed to maximize the number of Japanese Canadians libel for deportation. To accomplish that purpose the survey was deliberately slanted to encourage the confused, poverty stricken and demoralized inmates of the government's detention camps to choose Japan. The inmates were told that those who chose Japan could retain their jobs in B.C. or if unemployed could receive a relief allowance without any further depletion of their capital in the hands of the Custodian of Enemy Property[77]. They could keep the shacks they had improved at their own expense, and, if they had no capital left from supporting themselves in the camps, they would be guaranteed a resettlement allowance of $200 and free transportation. In contrast, inmates who chose Canada were to lose their jobs and be immediately shipped to the rotting tenements of the Kaslo detention camp where they would remain until sent to a job east of the Rocky Mountains. The suitability of that job was to be determined by the government, and there was no guarantee that it would last for more than a few weeks. There was also no guarantee that the move eastward would be permanent. [78] The inmates were told that the government was offering "such generous terms ... to those who come to the conclusion that conditions might be too difficult for them in Canada and the opportunity might be better in Japan"[79]

DRAFT

---

[76]See Estey J. in **Reference re Japanese Canadians**, supra, at 318, 320.
[77]Normally Japanese Canadians with capital from the sale of their property in the hands of the Custodian could not recieve relief until that capital was depleted.
[78]For the terms as presented to Japanese Canadians see T.B. Pickersgill Comnr. of Japanese Placement to R. Shirakawa, Chairman, Japanese Committee, Tashme, B.C. April 4 and 5, 1945 and Transcript of an Interview with T.B. Pickersgill, March 31, 1945, J.C.C.A. Papers, D 278, P.A.C.
[79]R.G. Robertson to W.L.M. King, April 23, 1945, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 36, C249590,

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

, because only Saskatchewan's C.C.F. government had expressed a willingness to accept Japanese Canadians.

The survey was attended by confusion, fear and turmoil. The government's records show that the inmates were told that signing for "repatriation" was not an indication of disloyalty and that they could revoke at a later date. [80] They show that while a minority sympathized with Japan, most signed the requests for reasons totally unconnected with the issue of loyalty or under pressures very similar to those which led an American court to rule denaturalization requests by Japanese Americans were invalid on the grounds that they were not made through the exercise of free, intelligent choice.[81] The records also show that the government knew the survey was biased and that public opinion was 4:1 against deporting Canadians of Japanese ancestry, [82] but rationalized that the survey "was fair in terms of what is politically feasible at the moment"[83]. To keep their jobs, to hide from the hostile outer world, in despair and confusion, under pressure from family and neighbours, 6,884 Japanese Canadians over the age of 16 signed the "repatriation" forms. If they and their 3,500 dependents were deported, while the rest were shipped east, Ian Mackenzie would accomplish his objective of ridding B.C. of Japanese Canadians.

DRAFT

In the end P.C. 7355 was never used. Upheld by the courts [84] it was defeated by the people of Canada. The court cases were fought only to buy time to mount an anti-deportation campaign. The churches, civil liberties groups, and the press, no longer fettered by censorship, were finally able to tell the Canadian people what was being done to Japanese Canadians. In the greatest outburst of public opinion in the long career of

---

[79](cont'd)P.A.C.
[80]T.B. Pickersgill, Comnr of Japanese Placement, to A.H. Brown, Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour, October 9, 1945, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 16, file 622, P.A.C. For the circumstances surrounding the "repatriation" survey see Department of Labour Papers, RG27, Vols. 1527 – 1529, P.A.C.
[81] **Acheson** v. **Murakami** (1949) 176 F. (2d) 953. See Sunahara, supra, 121 – 123 for evidence of the reasons for signing "repatriation" requests.
[82]In the eleven months after October 1944 when Ian Mackezie initiated an anti-deportation campaign in B.C. Prime Minister King received only 19 submissions demanding the mass deportation of Japanese Canadians and 85 urging a moderate policy. R.G. Robertson, Executive Assistant to Prime Minister King to H.H. Wrong, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 24, 1945, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 361, C249600 – C249606, P.A.C.
[83]Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to W.L.M. King, February 21, 1945, W.L.M.King Papers, Vol. 361, C249584, P.A.C.
[84]**Reference re Japanese Canadians**, supra, and **Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians et al.** v. **Attorney General of Canada et al.** [1947] 1 D.L.R. 577 (P.C.).

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

Prime Minister King, [85] ordinary people all across Canada, including British Columbia, told their government to stop abusing Japanese Canadians. P.C. 7355 was revoked, under protest from Ian Mackenzie and Louis St. Laurent[86], on January 27, 1947, although the civil rights of Japanese Canadians continued to be restricted until April 1, 1949.

Redress

Today, almost thirty five years after the restoration of their civil liberties, Japanese Canadians still await redress for the wartime burden they were wrongfully forced to bear. In that thirty-five years only one inadequate attempt was made to compensate them. In 1947 a Royal Commission [87] was set up to investigate the losses sustained by Japanese Canadians when their property was sold by the Custodian of Enemy Property. Four years and $87,000.00 in legal fees later, the federal government paid some 1100 claimaints slightly over one million dollars.[88] The government' records show that to minimize the amount paid to Japanese Canadians the terms of the Royal Commission were deliberately kept as narrow as possible. Although fully aware that Japanese Canadians had suffered at least six types of direct economic losses[89], the mandate of the Royal Commission was restricted to losses resulting from the sale of property by the Custodian at less than fair market value and from the theft of property in his care. Moreover that one million dollars was paid in deflated 1951 dollars, without interest, for losses sustained in the early 1940's.

The intention of the government when it reluctantly consented to the Royal Commission was to minimize the compensation paid and the attending criticism of the policies that caused the wrongs being compensated. [90] Consequently no consideration was

---

[85]Between December 1945 and March 1946 Prime Minister King received over 700 letters and resolutions opposing the deportation of Japanese Canadians. R.G. Robertson to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, March 4, 1946, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, file 2965, P.A.C. For the petitions and resolutions see Department of Labour Papers, RG27 Vol. 657, file 23-2-13-1, P.A.C. For letters from individuals see King's correspondence files, P.A.C. King himself called this the greatest outburst of public opinion of his career. Interview with Andrew Brewin, September 1976.

[86]W.L.M. King Diary, January 27, 1947, P.A.C.

[87]Commonly known as the Bird Commission.

[88]Sunahara, 159 and n. 40, p. 199.

[89]Cabinet Document JAP 5, F.P. Varcoe, Deputy Minister of Justice, to Dr. E.H. Coleman, Under-Secretary of State, January 1, 1947, British Columbia Security Commission (B.C.S.C.) Papers Vol. 34, file 2201, P.A.C.

[90]Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, **Minutes** April 21, 1947, Department of Labour Papers, RG27, Acc 70/383, Box 14, P.A.C.

DRAFT

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

given to most direct losses and to the physical, social and emotional price paid by Japanese Canadians during the seven years in which they were exiles in their own country. Nor was consideration given to the many years it took for the sores opened by that experience to heal or to the scars that remain today. Most importantly no consideration has ever been given to rectifying the means by which Japanese Canadians were abused: the unfettered powers of the War Measures Act.

Self-seeking politicians were able to abuse 20,000 innocent people because the law under which Canada is governed in time of emergency, the War Measures Act, gives the Executive unfettered power from which there is no appeal. The courts will not question an order in council made under the War Measures Act where that order is deemed necessary by the Governor in Council (in fact the Cabinet) and made in time of "real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection". [91] Nor can the victims of repressive orders in council under the War Measures Act appeal for help to Parliament. [92] Once the War Measures Act is validly in force Parliament cannot annul any order in council made under it. Parliament can only countermand such orders by bringing down the government. The likelihood of that occuring in a time of crisis over any issue except one so fundamental that Parliament must choose between destroying the government and massive public anger is extremely small. Because of the flaws in the War Measures Act, therefore, the victims of repression under that Act have no avenues of appeal. It is still not only possible, but perfectly legal, for any Cabinet operating under the War Measures Act to victimize innocent Canadians for political purposes.

---

[91] **Reference as to the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to Chemicals** [1943] S.C.R. 1 at 11.

[92] In this respect the War Measures Act stands in stark contrast to its British counterpart. The Emergency Powers (Defence) (No. 2) Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. 6, c. 45 (U.K.) was subject to annual renewal by Parliament, required that each order in council passed under it be laid before Parliament, and made provision for either House of Parliament to annul any order in council within 28 days of presentation.

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

APPENDIX OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Background

F.J. Mead, Asst Comnr, to S.T. Wood, Comnr R.C.M.P., August 21, 1940, RG 24, vol 2730, file HQS-5199x, P.A.C.

Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, **First Interim Report** February 9, 1939, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 32, file X-52, p. 2. P.A.C.

L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minster, Department of National Defence, to F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Ottawa, June 2, 1938, Extract from HQS 7368, vol 1, microreel 629A P.A.B.C.

J.E. Michaud to Ian Mackenzie, January 17, 1940, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 19, file 29-7, P.A.C.

I.A. Mackenzie to N.A. McLarty, June 5, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, Vol 25, P.A.C.

Removal and Detention

Order in Council P.C. 1486, February 24, 1942

Ministerial Order Removing Japanese Canadians From the Pacific Coast, February 26, 1942

W.L.M. King, Canada, House of Commons, **Debates**, February 25, 1942, p. 180.

Letters and Resolutions re Japanese Canadians, December 7, 1941 to February 24, 1942, External Affairs Archives, file 773-b-1-40, parts 1 and 2.

Cabinet War Committee, **Minutes**, December 29, 1941, RG2/16, P.A.C.

H.L. Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Vice Chief of General Staff, January 3, 1942, with Pope's agreement, file 773-B-40, E.A.A.

Conference on the Japanese Problem in B.C., **Report**, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

Conference on Japanese Problems, **Minutes**, p. 6, Dept. of External Affairs file

DRAFT

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

773-B-40C, E.A.A.

Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M. King, January 10, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

Maj. Gen. R.O. Alexander to Chief of General Staff, December 30, 1941, file 322.009(D358), Department of National Defense.

Summary of Memorandum, Vice Chief of General Staff to Chief of General Staff, January 13, 1942, extracted from HQS 7368, vol 1, Defence Records, 322.009(D358), Directorate of History, D.N.D.

Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to Ian Mackenzie and W.L.M. King, January 26, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81(2), P.A.C.

Notes and Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, February 19, 1942, J.L. Ralston Papers, MGIIIB11, Vol. 37, P.A.C.

Canada, Cabinet War Committee, **Minutes**, February 26, 1942, RG 2/16, vol. 8, P.A.C.

DRAFT

Dispossession

Order in Council P.C. 469, January 19, 1943

Ian Mackenzie to T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, April 14, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 25, 70-25-8, P.A.C.

T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, to N.A. McLarty, Secretary of State, November 30, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 25, file 70-25(c), P.A.C.

Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to N.A. Robertson, July 16, 1943, External Affairs Files, 3464-B-40-C, E.A.A.

Henry F. Angus to N.A. Robertson March 15, 1943, External Affairs file 3464-R-40, E.A.A.

Henry F. Angus to W.L.M. King, March 15, 1943, External Affairs file 3464-R-40, E.A.A.

Estimated Value of Japanese owned property by the Office of the Custodian of Enemy Property. G.W. MacPherson to Dr. E. H. Coleman, January 19, 1943, RG117, Vol T95, P.A.C..

Cash realizations as of March 31, 1947, Memorandum to Cabinet, Ian Mackenzie Papers, Vol. 79, P.A.C.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

Minute of an interdepartmental meeting on the Japanese question, June 30, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-B-40(2), E.A.A.

Note for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 12, 1943, External Affairs File 4606-C-13-40, E.A.A.

Deportation

Order in Council P.C. 7355, December 15, 1945

Correspondence Re Repatriation Survey: T.B. Pickersgill, Comnr of Japanese Placement, to R. Shirakawa, Chairman, Japanese Committee, Tashme, B.C., April 4 and 5, 1945, Japanese Canadian Citizens' Association (J.C.C.A.) Papers, D 278, P.A.C.

Interview with T.B. Pickersgill, March 31, 1945 J.C.C.A. Papers, D 278, P.A.C.

R.G. Robertson to W.L.M. King, April 23, 1945, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 36, C249590, P.A.C.

T.B. Pickersgill, Comnr of Japanese Placement, to A.H. Brown, Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour, October 9, 1945, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 16, file 622, P.A.C.

R.G. Robertson to H.H. Wrong, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 24, 1945, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 361, C249600 - C249606, P.A.C.

Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to W.L.M. King, February 21, 1945, W.L.M.King Papers, Vol. 361, C249584, P.A.C.

R.G. Robertson to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, March 4, 1946, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, file 2965, P.A.C.

W.L.M. King Diary, January 27, 1947, P.A.C.

DRAFT

Redress

Cabinet Document JAP 5, F.P. Varcoe, Deputy Minister of Justice, to Dr. E.H. Coleman, Under-Secretary of State, January 1, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, Vol. 34, file 2201, P.A.C.

Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, **Minutes** April 21, 1947, Department of

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

24

Labour Papers, RG27, Acc 70/383, Box 14, P.A.C.

DRAFT

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

NOTICE

TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE RACIAL ORIGIN

Having reference to the Protected Area of British Columbia as described in an Extra of the Canada Gazette, No. 174 dated Ottawa, Monday, February 2, 1942:-

1. EVERY PERSON OF THE JAPANESE RACE, WHILE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA AFORESAID, SHALL HEREAFTER BE AT HIS USUAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE EACH DAY BEFORE SUNSET AND SHALL REMAIN THEREIN UNTIL SUNRISE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, AND NO SUCH PERSON SHALL GO OUT OF HIS USUAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE AFORESAID UPON THE STREETS OR OTHERWISE DURING THE HOURS BETWEEN SUNSET AND SUNRISE;

2. NO PERSON OF THE JAPANESE RACE SHALL HAVE IN HIS POSSESSION OR USE IN SUCH PROTECTED AREA ANY MOTOR VEHICLE, CAMERA, RADIO TRANSMITTER, RADIO RECEIVING SET, FIREARM, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVE;

3. IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF EVERY PERSON OF THE JAPANESE RACE HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION OR UPON HIS PREMISES ANY ARTICLE MENTIONED IN THE NEXT PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, FORTHWITH TO CAUSE SUCH ARTICLE TO BE DELIVERED UP TO ANY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE RESIDING IN OR NEAR THE LOCALITY WHERE ANY SUCH ARTICLE IS HAD IN POSSESSION, OR TO AN OFFICER OR CONSTABLE OF THE POLICE FORCE OF THE PROVINCE OR CITY IN OR NEAR SUCH LOCALITY OR TO AN OFFICER OR CONSTABLE OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE.

4. ANY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR OFFICER OR CONSTABLE RECEIVING ANY ARTICLE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS ORDER SHALL GIVE TO THE PERSON DELIVERING THE SAME A RECEIPT THEREFOR AND SHALL REPORT THE FACT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, AND SHALL RETAIN OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF ANY SUCH ARTICLE AS DIRECTED BY THE SAID COMMISSIONER.

5. ANY PEACE OFFICER OR ANY OFFICER OR CONSTABLE OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE HAVING POWER TO ACT AS SUCH PEACE OFFICER OR OFFICER OR CONSTABLE IN THE SAID PROTECTED AREA, IS AUTHORIZED TO SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT THE PREMISES OR ANY PLACE OCCUPIED OR BELIEVED TO BE OCCUPIED BY ANY PERSON OF THE JAPANESE RACE REASONABLY SUSPECTED OF HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION OR UPON HIS PREMISES ANY ARTICLE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS ORDER, AND TO SEIZE ANY SUCH ARTICLE FOUND ON SUCH PREMISES;

6. EVERY PERSON OF THE JAPANESE RACE SHALL LEAVE THE PROTECTED AREA AFORESAID FORTHWITH;

7. NO PERSON OF THE JAPANESE RACE SHALL ENTER SUCH PROTECTED AREA EXCEPT UNDER PERMIT ISSUED BY THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE;

8. IN THIS ORDER, "PERSONS OF THE JAPANESE RACE" MEANS, AS WELL AS ANY PERSON WHOLLY OF THE JAPANESE RACE, A PERSON NOT WHOLLY OF THE JAPANESE RACE IF HIS FATHER OR MOTHER IS OF THE JAPANESE RACE AND IF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE BY NOTICE IN WRITING HAS REQUIRED OR REQUIRES HIM TO REGISTER PURSUANT TO ORDER-IN-COUNCIL P.C. 9760 OF DECEMBER 16th, 1941.

DATED AT OTTAWA THIS 26th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1942.

Louis S. St. Laurent,
Minister of Justice

To be posted in a Conspicuous Place

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

R.C.M.P.

A CALL FOR REDRESS:

The Japanese Canadian Case

SELECTED DOCUMENTS

Prewar Documents

F.J. Mead, Asst Comnr, to S.T. Wood, Comnr R.C.M.P., August 21, 1940, RG 24, vol 2730, file HQS-5199x, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.)

Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, **First Interim Report** February 9, 1939, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 32, file X-52, p. 2. P.A.C.

L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minster, Department of National Defence, to F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Ottawa, June 2, 1938, Extract from HQS 7368, vol 1, microreel 629A, Provincial Archives of British Columbia.

J.E. Michaud to Ian Mackenzie, January 17, 1940, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 19, file 29-7, P.A.C.

Public Reaction, 1941 - 1942

Letters and Resolutions re Japanese Canadians, December 7, 1941 to February 24, 1942, External Affairs File 773-b-1-40, parts 1 and 2, External Affairs Archives (hereafter E.A.A.).

The Decision to Uproot Japanese Canadians

The January Conference

Conference on Japanese Problems, **Minutes**, p. 6, Dept. of External Affairs File 773-B-40C, E.A.A.

The Politicians' Position

Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M. King, January 10, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

[illegible] Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Conference on the Japanese Problem in B.C., **Report**, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

The Position of the Military, Police and Department of External Affairs

Summary of Memorandum, Vice Chief of General Staff to Chief of General Staff, January 13, 1942, extracted from HQS 7368, vol 1, Defence Records, 322.009(D358), Directorate of History, Department of National Defence.

Memorandum, Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to Ian Mackenzie and W.L.M. King, January 26, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81(2), P.A.C.

Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, February 19, 1942, J.L. Ralston Papers, MGIIIB11, Vol. 37, P.A.C.

Canada, Cabinet War Committee, **Minutes**, February 26, 1942, RG 2/16, vol. 8, P.A.C.

The Order Removing Japanese Canadians From the Pacific Coast

Ministerial Order Removing Japanese Canadians From the Pacific Coast, February 26, 1942

Property Rights

Ian Mackenzie to T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, April 14, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 25, 70-25-3, P.A.C.

Opposition from the Civil Service

Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to N.A. Robertson, July 16, 1943, External Affairs Files, 3464-B-40-C, E.A.A.

Henry F. Angus to N.A. Robertson March 15, 1943, External Affairs file 3464-R-40, E.A.A.

Policy on Licences to Purchase Land

Note for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 12, 1943, External Affairs File 4606-C-13-40, E.A.A.

Policy on Maintenance

Minutes, Interdepartmental Committee on Japanese Questions, June 30, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-B-40C, E.A.A.

Memorandum on Maintenance, December 27, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-B-40C,

...by the Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

E.A.A.

Deportation

Notices to Persons of the Japanese Race, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 16, File 622, P.A.C.

Public Reaction to the Deportation of Japanese Canadians

R.G. Robertson, Assistant to the Prime Minister, to H.H. Wrong, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 24, 1945, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 361, C249600 - C249606, P.A.C.

Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, January 5, 1946, W.L.M.King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, File 2965, C194932, P.A.C.

R.G. Robertson to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, March 4, 1946, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, file 2965, P.A.C.

Minutes of a Meeting Concerning the Problem of Japanese in Canada, March 26, 1946, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, File 2965, C194959 - C194963, P.A.C.

W.L.M. King Diary, January 22, 1947, P.A.C.

The Royal Commission

Cabinet Document JAP 5, F.P. Varcoe, Deputy Minister of Justice, to Dr. E.H. Coleman, Under-Secretary of State, January 1, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, Vol. 34, file 2201, P.A.C.

Memorandum, Secretary of State to the Special Cabinet Committee on Claims by Japanese Evacuees, March 27, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 34, File 2201, P.A.C.

Postwar Restrictions on Japanese Canadians

Memorandum, Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, to the Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, October 24, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 34, File

by the Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

FOLDER NO. 7

2201, P.A.C.

J.L. Ilsley, Secretary of State, to Raymond Ranger, Secretary, Cabinet Committee on Japanese Questions, November 18, 1947, B.C.S.C. Papers, RG 36/27, Vol. 34, File 2201, P.A.C.

Memorandum Re Japanese Orders Under Transitional Measures Act, J.W. Pickersgill, Assistant to the Prime Minister, to Prime Minister W.L.M. King, February 12, 1948, W.L.M. King Papers, MG26J4, Vol. 283, File 2965, C195016 - 195018, P.A.C.

[illegible] by the Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Prewar Documents

F.J. Mead, Asst Comnr, to S.T. Wood, Comnr R.C.M.P., August 21, 1940, RG 24, vol 2730, file HQS-5199x, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.)

Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, **First Interim Report** February 9, 1939, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 32, file X-52, p. 2. P.A.C.

L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minster, Department of National Defence, to F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Ottawa, June 2, 1938, Extract from HQS 7368, vol 1, microreel 629A, Provincial Archives of British Columbia.

J.E. Michaud to Ian Mackenzie, January 17, 1940, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5 Vol 19, file 29-7, P.A.C.

These documents reflect the various attitudes toward Japanese Canadians in the prewar period. Asst. Comnr. Fredrick John Mead of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was responsible for security on the Pacific Coast in 1940. He later served an important role as one of the three men supervising the uprooting of Japanese Canadians. In that latter role he put into effect the fairness and trust he shows in this letter, doing everything he could to moderate the treatment of Japanese Canadians.

The Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens in Canada as the first page of this document shows was diverse. While some members, notably F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Department of Mines and Resources, were very anti-Asian, most merely reflected the values of their day. Colonel Maurice Pope appears again as the Vice Chief of General Staff at the January 1942 Conference where he opposed the attempts by B.C. politicians to intern Japanese Canadians.

L.R. Lafleche, Deputy Minister of National Defence, was serving in 1938 under Ian Alistair Mackenzie, the then Minister of National Defence and the political strategist behind the Liberal Party's anti-Asian election campaigns in British Columbia. Since no security officer was appointed to the Pacific Command until 1940, it would appear that LaFleche is only adopting the personal prejudices of his Minister.

Jean E. Michaud is probably typical of those among the Cabinet who recognized the immorality of Canada's discriminatory laws but were prepared to tolerate racism if someone else assumed responsibility for any political or moral repercussions arising from

[illegible] by the Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

FOLDER NO. 7

racist policies. As this letter illustrates, one of Ian Mackenzie's roles in Cabinet was to dictate government policy affecting Asians.

by the Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

"I [illegible]SION R.C.M.P.
(C.I.B.)

SECRET

S. 49. Vancouver, B.C. August 21st, 1940.

40D 1087-J-1.

For Personal Perusal of
the Commissioner, please.

The Commissioner,
R. C. M. Police,
Ottawa, Canada.

Sir:

Re: Japanese Situation in British Columbia.

1. Referring to our conversation on the above noted subject: Since my arrival in Vancouver I have thoroughly discussed this whole matter with D/Insp. Fripps and S/Cst. Henry, and have had three long conversations on different days with Mr. Etsuji Morii.

2. I conveyed your compliments to Mr. Morii, and he was very pleased to hear of you. He at once advised me that his services were at our disposal, assuring me that no untoward incident would happen in Canada on the part of the Japanese should hostilities develop as a result of the strained relations now existing between Great Britain and the Japanese Empire. I should have been glad if you could have been present during these conversations, as I feel sure you would have felt as both D/Inspector Fripps and I felt - i.e. "that here was something tangible in the way of assurance that no fear from sabotage need be expected from the Japanese in Canada". I realise that this is a broad statement to make, at the same time I know it to be true.

3. Mr. Morii, as you know from past experience, wields a great influence in all sections of Japanese life in Canada. From what I hear, I believe this influence has increased during the years since we left British Columbia. His assurance, which he asked me to convey to you, can be set out as follows:-

(a) The Japanese of British Columbia believe that the future of themselves and their children are bound up with the fortunes of the Canadian people, and for that reason Canadian interests are their interests.

(b) Of the 23,000 Japanese resident in Canada, 12,714 are Canadian-born; 2,158 are naturalised; the remainder having been born in Japan. Note: (These figures are the result of a survey made by the Canadian-Japanese Association of Canada, and, although they are not as high as some figures quoted as to the population of people of Japanese blood in Canada, it is believed

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Re: Japanese Situation in B.C.

they are authentic. The census was taken in 1928, and naturally there would be a slight increase by now.) Therefore, you will note that a majority of the Japanese in Canada are Canadian citizens either by birth or naturalisation.

(c) Although among the fishermen of Japanese blood, operating on the Pacific Coast, there are ex-members of the army and navy of Japan, it must be remembered these men were conscripts and they should not be considered as potential enemies of this Country on that account alone.

(d) Mr. Morii states, although there may be several hot-headed individuals among the Japanese who might be foolish enough to express their feelings in some way or another, he wished you to know that nothing would happen on account of these people, as he himself would attend to them and see that they were made incapable of committing any harm.

(e) Mr. Morii further assured me that the Japanese in Canada were grateful for the privileges they enjoy in this Country, and he wished me to be most emphatic in advising you they would not do anything to embarrass the Government of Canada under any circumstances, He asked me to accept his word of honour with regard to this.

(f) Mr. Morii further assured me no agitation would be allowed in the Japanese controlled press of British Columbia against the present agitation being carried on in the Canadian newspapers in Vancouver.

(g) The Japanese have complied with the orders regarding National Registration 100%, according to the Vancouver Press.

4. After studying the question on the spot, the thought occurs to me that there is far more possibility of trouble developing against the Japanese in Canada as result of agitation at present being carried on by certain individuals, than there would be by the Japanese against this Country. I feel that the present agitation being carried on by Alderman Halford Wilson is provocative, and in times such as these downright dangerous if it is allowed to go on unchecked.

5. Already the word has gone out among the Japanese that they must remain calm and quiet under the present attacks, and must show by example that they are law-abiding citizens who wished to live in peace with their neighbours.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Re: Japanese Situation in B.C.

6. At the time of writing there is little I can add to this preliminary report. It is my intention to see a few individuals with a view to having them exert some influence against the agitation now going on, and if it continues it might be advisable that the Censorship Department of the Government take some action to prevent publicity being given by the newspapers on this subject in these critical times.

7. I am attaching hereto a list of all the Japanese Organisations in Canada for purposes of record. Mr. Morii exercises a large measure of control over all of these organisations. He explains his position by the statement that he continuously adopts a neutral attitude where any differences of opinion between Japanese are the cause of trouble, and he has their confidence on this account. You may perhaps be aware that his services were requisitioned by the Japanese in San Francisco for the purpose of settling strife among themselves in that City four years ago. He is a naturalised Canadian, having taken out his papers in December 1914. An Imperial Naturalisation Certificate was granted in September 1936. He came to Canada in 1906 and has not returned since that time.

8. As you already know, his influence among the Japanese is very great, and I am certain we can trust him to see that in the unfortunate event of trouble arising in the future this great influence will be on the side of Canada. He is respected by the officials of the Japanese Consulate who seek his advice in many matters. He was very frank in explaining his relationship to the Consulate to me. He advises that his chief interest is in the welfare of the Japanese-Canadians in their work and social relations in this Country.

9. Regarding the agitation being conducted by Alderman Wilson, this was commenced about three years ago. S.A. 402 indicated to me its origin in a conversation I had with him recently. You will recollect that when Communist agitation was at its height here eight or nine years ago, a determined attempt was made by the Communist Party to organise the Japanese fishermen into a Communist controlled union. Mr. Morii was instrumental in preventing this. His action was very much resented by the organiser, a man named MILLER, who was the Communist Party representative, and I have it on the authority of S.A. 402 that Miller is the man who supplies Mr. Wilson with "ammunition" in his campaign against the Japanese in Canada. Is it possible that this is a small part of a wide Communist policy to create friction?

10. I shall write you further regarding statements in Paragraph 4.

(SGD)

(F.J. Mead)
Asst. Commissioner.

FJM/M.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

COMMITTEE ON THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS AND ALIEN PROPERTY

First Interim Report

(1) The standing Interdepartmental Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property was set up pursuant to the terms of Minute of Council (P.C. 531) dated 14th March, 1938.

(2) The Committee is composed as follows :

E. H. Coleman, K.C., LL.D.,
Under Secretary of State, Chairman

J. E. Read, K.C.,
Department of External Affairs,

J. F. MacNeill,
Department of Justice,

Inspector C. Rivett-Carnac,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,

F. C. Blair,
Department of Mines and Resources,

W. C. Clark, C.M.G., LL.D.,(D. M. Johnson, substitute)
Department of Finance,

Colonel Maurice Pope,
Department of National Defence,

D. J. Shuttleworth,
Department of the Secretary of State,
Secretary.

(3) Terms of Reference : The Committee's terms of reference are: to inquire into and report upon the treatment of aliens and alien property in time of war or emergency real or apprehended.

(4) General Observations : The Committee, in studying the problem referred to it, has recognized that

time ---

time may not permit the working out in precise detail of schemes for the internment of enemy aliens, since entirely different considerations would have to be taken into account in the event of War with certain countries. For example, if the enemy should be an Asiatic power, the work of any organizations to deal with the question of enemy aliens would be concentrated almost entirely in British Columbia, since the number of nationals of Asiatic powers who reside in other Provinces is almost negligible. It might be necessary, in that contingency, to recommend the internment of nearly all the enemy nationals, since it is recognized that public feeling in that section of Canada on the part of Canadian citizens and other Asiatics might render this course necessary, not alone to avoid danger of espionage and sabotage, but also for the protection of the person and property of enemy aliens.

On the other hand, if the enemy should be one of the European powers, or a combination of those European powers which, within recent years, have repudiated democratic or parliamentary systems of Government, it is realized that many of the nationals of those powers, who have come, within the last few years, to take up residence in Canada are, in effect, refugees. Some of these powers, by decree, have deprived some of their citizens or subjects of citizenship on account of racial and other considerations. In the event of war, therefore, the sympathies of these persons, in most instances, would not be with the powers of which they are, viewed from the technical point of view of Canadian law, deemed to be nationals.

It ---

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES

OTTAWA

6-0-7

Extract from H.Q.S. 7368 Vol.1

H.Q.S. 7368

SECRET

2nd June
25th-May, 1938.

Sir,

I beg to refer to your letter of the 18th March, addressed to Major Macklin, relative to the Interdepartmental Committee on Orientals in British Columbia and to append hereunder the views of this Department on this problem from the aspect of National Defence.

1. Because of the problem they present with respect to internal security, and the protection of vulnerable points in time of war, the presence of a considerable number of orientals in British Columbia is a matter which, from the aspect of National Defence, cannot be viewed other than with concern.

2. The Census returns for 1931 indicate that there are some 24,000 persons of Japanese origin resident in British Columbia, of whom some 5,000 are men of military age owing allegiance to Japan. It is understood that accurate information is lacking as to the identity and domicile of many of these orientals, who, it is reported may have considerably increased in number since 1931. In any event the above figures are, in themselves, sufficient to make it expedient to draw up somewhat elaborate plans for the internal security of British Columbia in time of war. It will be realized that a considerable proportion of the troops presently in British Columbia will be required to furnish the garrisons necessary for the military defence of the coastal ports. This being so, the plans now being prepared for the guarding of the vulnerable points along the railways and elsewhere, call for the despatch of some 9 Militia units numbering upwards of 2,000 all ranks, from other parts of Canada.

3. During the Great War all enemy aliens, whom there was reason to fear might prove to be a danger to the community, were interned. Actually, in Canada, the course followed was to restrict internment to narrowest limits consistent with public safety and public sentiment. Consequently, all enemy aliens who were prepared to give an undertaking to obey the law and to pursue their peaceful avocations were exempted from internment.

F.C. Blair, Esq.,
Director of Immigration,
Jackson Building,
Ottawa.

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES

OTTAWA

4. While the question has yet to be inquired into by the Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, it would appear doubtful if such a course of action could safely be followed with respect to Japanese nationals in British Columbia. Indeed, there seems to be little reason for any assurance as to the peaceful behaviour of even Canadian nationals of Japanese origin at a time when racial feelings will be aroused. It is therefore quite possible that action will be required (it seems possible that public sentiment will so demand) to restrain the activities and, consequently, the liberties of such Canadian nationals of Japanese origin whose sympathies may be deemed hostile to this country.

5. It is considered that the responsibility for the recognition and arrest of enemy aliens in time of war rests elsewhere than with the Department of National Defence. On the other hand, it would appear that on this Department will devolve the tasks of setting up such camps as may be required to quarter the internees, and to make provision for their administration and safe custody. It follows then that the Department of National Defence may some day find itself required to provide facilities for the detention of upwards of 10,000 persons in British Columbia alone. As experience shows that on an average the proportion of troops to internees is 1 to 5, it follows that the Department must hold itself in readiness to call out the considerable number of 2,000 troops for this duty.

6. Further, on the defence forces also falls the duty of ensuring the security of defence establishments and bases from which the Naval and Air Forces will operate their patrols. The presence of enemy aliens near these points is obviously undesirable as the greater the number of such persons the greater will be the precautions which will have to be taken. Consequently, it is desirable to prohibit, as far as it may be possible, the transfer to foreign nationals, without prior Government authority, of property adjacent to areas of military importance. Such areas are to be found at Esquimalt, Yorke Island, Prince Rupert, Bella Bella, Alliford Bay in the Queen Charlotte Islands, Winter Harbour on Vancouver Island.

7. Consequently, from the point of view of guarding vulnerable points and from the obligation to administer and staff internment camps, there is every reason to desire a diminution in the number of orientals, especially Japanese, in British Columbia, or at least to ensure that the present number is not allowed to increase.

Yours very truly,

(L.R. LaFleche)
Deputy Minister.

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES
OTTAWA

CANADA

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

January 17, 1940.

Personal

My dear Colleague:

Re: Boat pullers licenses -
Canadians of Japanese origin.

It will soon be time for me to exercise my prerogative duty and authorize the issuance of boat pullers licenses to British subjects of Japanese origin.

As you are aware, the renewal of these licenses is always the occasion of requests by the British subjects of Japanese origin that they should not be curtailed, while, on the other hand, some British subjects of White origin claim that the Japanese should be eliminated.

Between those two diametrically opposed views, I have to act "Salomon" like.

For your information I may give you the following figures:

In 1937, and for some years previous, salmon gill net licenses issued -	528
In 1938, a reduction of 40% was made decreasing the number to -	317
In 1939, a further reduction of 21% over the previous year was also made bringing them down to	250

The Honourable Ian Mackenzie, P.C.
Minister of Pensions and National Health,
O t t a w a.

.....

FOLDER NO. 7

It was later arranged to issue 26 additional licenses to returned soldiers of Japanese origin. So, last year, we issued 276 licenses.

Some representations are being made that we should, at least, revert back to the limit established in the year 1937 and that we should issue 317 licenses.

I have received representations and petitions from Mayors and Wardens of Municipalities in the Delta area to the effect that the reduction of these boat pullers licenses was the cause of further unemployment and an increase in the relief roll.

I must confess that I have always found it difficult to justify this arbitrary legislation against British subjects of Japanese origin. This year, in view of the reasons that we are giving for our participation in the European War, it would seem all the more difficult to explain why we are adopting against these British subjects of Japanese origin the technique that Hitler adopted against the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the Poles.

Of course, I am willing to be guided by your opinion with the assurance that when the time comes you will justify my arbitrary attitude.

Yours very truly,

J. L. Ilsley

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Conference on Japanese Problems in B.C., January 8 - 9, 1942
... Internal Affairs Files 733 - B - 40 - C.

Public Reaction, 1941 - 1942

Letters and Resolutions re Japanese Canadians, December 7, 1941 to February 24, 1942, External Affairs File 773-b-1-40, parts 1 and 2, External Affairs Archives (hereafter E.A.A.).

This list of letters and resolutions represent every comunication received by Prime Minister King and by the Department of External Affairs on the subject of Japanese Canadians between the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the decision to uproot all Japanese Canadians on February 24, 1942, 12 weeks later. These documents show a pattern of demands by particular interest groups, mostly veterans and political organizations, for the removal of Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast. It is significant that many of these organizations have interlocking memberships and many are located in or around Victoria, B.C., where very few Japanese Canadians resided. Most of these organizatins had also agitated for the internment of German and Italian Canadians in 1940, agitation the government wisely ignored.

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Conference on Japanese Problems in B.C., January 8 - 9, 1942
... ... External Affairs Files 733 - B - 40 - C.

Letters and Resolutions Re Japanese Canadians

December 7, 1941 to February 24, 1942

External Affairs File 773-B-1-40, Pt. 1 and 2, E.A.A.

December 10:	Individual[1] – demands the internment of all Japanese families.
December 17:	Burnaby[2] Board of Trade – opposing fishing licences for Japanese Canadians.
	British Imperial Comrades Association – wants Japanese nationals and naturalized Japanese Canadians removed "to a central position in Canada" and the enlistment of Japanese Canadian volunteers into the army.
	Individual – writes that "Japs" are not to be trusted and demands that all be interned and their fishing licences cancelled.
December 18:	R.C.M.P., Intelligence Section – reports discouraging an attempt by the United Fishermen's Federal Union of British Columbia to hold a mass meeting on fishing licences for Japanese Canadians.
December 20:	Coordinated Veteran's Association – opposes fishing licences for Japanese Canadians.
December 23:	Individual – writes that there are 62,000 [sic] "Japs" in B.C. who could be doing a lot of damage.
December 27:	Individual – demands Japanese fishing boats be sold to white men.
	Individual – demands the internment of "every Jap in Canada".
December 29 to 31:	The Mayors of five municipalities send identical telegrams urging the internment of Japanese Canadians: Port Alberni, Courtney, Nanaimo, Ladysmith, and Duncan.
December 30:	Elks Lodge No. 69 (Duncan) – urges internment of Japanese.
	Municipal Council of Duncan – urges internment of Japanese.
	Victoria Kiwanis Club – urges internment of Japanese.

---

[1]Access to these documents was granted on the condition that the identity of individuals would remain confidential.
[2]All locations are in British Columbia unless otherwise indicated.

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

January 2: The President of the Nanaimo and Islands Provincial Liberal Association and the Vice President of the Nanaimo Federal Liberal Association endorse the demand of their Member of Parliament for an evacuation of Japanese Canadians.

United Fishermen's Federal Union, Local 44 (Vancouver) – opposes fishing licences for Japanese Canadians.

President of the Victoria Chamber of Commerce – notes a "considerable amount of local agitation to intern all Japanese residents" in his New Years Greeting to his Member of Parliament, R.W. Mayhew.

January 3: B.C. Fishermen's Protective Association, Whonnock, meeting at New Westminster, B.C. – urges the abolition of Japanese Canadian fishing licences and the removal of Japanese Canadians "to self-supporting colonies in the Interior".

Individual – urges that Japanese Canadians be allowed to demonstrate their loyalty as non-combatant members of the armed forces.

January 5: T.J. O'Neill, Member of Parliament, to Dr. H.L. Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs – supports the January 2nd resolution submitted by the United Fishermen's Federal Union.

Pacific Cooperative Union – supports the loyalty of Japanese Canadians.

3 Individuals – doubt the loyalty of Japanese Canadians and want them removed from the coast and deported to Japan.

An individual – supports the loyalty of Japanese Canadians

B.C. Interior Vegetable Marketing Board – wants to use unemployed Japanese fishermen as labour in the Okanagan Valley.

Editor of the **Parashooter** [a racist paramilitary magazine published in Vancouver] – reiterates that he has long favoured the removal of every "Japanese male citizen" over 16 to 100 miles from the Pacific coast.

January 6: Malahat Board of Trade, Shwanigan Lake – urges the removal of all Japanese from the Pacific Coast.

Kamloops Board of Trade – offers full support in any measure to isolate Japanese Canadians.

British Columbia Fruit Growers Association – want to use unemployed Japanese fishermen for labour.

J.G. Turgeon, Member of Parliament, to W.L.M. King – "If the government does not take drastic action the situation will get out-of-hand. The Government will suffer, and so will the Japanese, personally and through destruction of property."

FOLDER NO. 7

B.C. Regional Representative, C.B.C., to General Manager, C.B.C. – "Most people have been taking a reasonable attitude toward the Japanese residents in B.C., but there has been a concerted and organized attempt on the part of certain individuals to disturb the good relations which exist and to foment trouble between Japanese and White Canadians."

Sooke and North Sooke Women's Institute urges the removal of Japanese Canadians.

January 7: Rotary Club of Duncan – urges the removal of the entire Japanese population east of the Rockies.

British Columbia Fruit Growers – state that they are prepared to accept coastal Japanese into the Okanagan Valley "under government supervision for the duration."

Cowichan Branch, Canadian Legion, Duncan, – urges the internment of Japanese Canadians.

Britannia Beach Branch, Canadian Legion, Victoria – urges "protective custody" for all Japanese Canadians.

Oak Bay A.R.P. Wardens – urge the internment of all Japanese.

Royal Air Force Ex-Officers' Association, Vancouver – urges the removal of all Japanese from the Pacific Coast.

United Fishermen's Federal Union – urges the prohibition of fishing licences to Japanese Canadians.

R.W. Mayhew, Member of Parliament, to W.L.M. King – urges the movement of all Japanese except the Canadian born to the Interior to work.

Vancouver District Trade and Labour Council – endorses the United Fishermen's Federal Union, Local 44, resolution opposing fishing licences for Japanese Canadians.

January 8: Vancouver Council No. 211, Canadian Order of Chosen Friends – urges the internment of all Japanese.

Esquimault Civilian Protection Committee composed of leaders of A.R.P. sections representing 310 A.R.P. Wardens – urge the internment of Japanese nationals.

James Bay A.R.P. Wardens – urges the removal of all Japanese east of the Rockies.

Gyro Club of Victoria – urges the internment of all Japanese or their removal inland.

Individual – urges the enlistment of Canadian-born Japanese in the army for service on the western front.

January 9: President of the United Church Conference of B.C. – writes in support of Japanese Canadians.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Daughters of St. George, Victoria Lodge No. 83 – urges the internment of all Japanese.

Provincial Board of Missions to Orientals, Administrative Committee – urges fair play toward Japanese residents of Canada.

Individual – writes "The suggestion of putting the whole Japanese population in work camps, or taking them all east of the Rockies, seems to me to demonstrate a complete bankruptcy of decency and imagination. ... The public – any of it that I have seen or heard – is not unreasonable."

Individual – comments that the there has been no fifth column activity because "Japs are a patient people."

Rev. W. R. McWilliams, United Church Minister, forwards to H.F. Angus an account of a meeting of 500 Japanese fishermen from Steveston at which the fishermen resolved to cooperate completely with the Canadian government and offered their services to the government.

January 10:

Native Sons of Canada, Assembly No. 1, Victoria – urges the internment of all Japanese and their deportation after the war.

Executive Board, Amalgamated Building Workers of Canada – want Japanese Canadians excluded from the food industry.

Vancouver South Conservative Association – urge removal of all persons of Japanese racial origin east of the Rockies. Canadians.

Capital City Commercial Club, Victoria, – urges the internment of all Japanese resident in the province whether native or immigrant.

Individual from Espanola, Ontario "with family in B.C." – writes suggesting that the fate of the "53,000 [sic] Japs officially in Canada" be determined by the behavior of the Imperial Japanese Army at Nanking in China.

January 11:

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners – oppose fishing licences for Japanese Canadians for the duration.

January 12:

National Union of Machinists, Fitters and Helpers, Local No. 2, Victoria – urges the internment of all Japanese.

January 13:

Public meeting of 250 "citizens of all walks of life" in Duncan – urges removal of all male Japanese of military age from the Pacific Coast.

British Columbia Conservative Association Annual Meeting – urges the removal of all Japanese since it is "difficult to segregate those who are loyal to Canada".

Professor, University of British Columbia – writes in support of Japanese Canadians, especially the Canadian–born.

FOLDER NO. 7

United Church Conference of British Columbia – urges "no deviation from the Christian principle of fair play" and warns against "ugly Hitlerian methods".

January 14: A.R.P. Wardens in Victoria (150) – urge the removal of all Japanese east of the Rockies.

January 15: Toastmasters' Club of Victoria – urges the evacuation of all adult Japanese from B.C. and the deportation of all females after the war.

Kyuquot Trollers' Cooperative Association (351 members) – urges the removal of all male Japanese of military age and the deportation all Japanese after the war.

British Columbia Interior Marketing Board and the British Columbia Fruit Growers Association – urge the removal of all male Japanese nationals.

Kelowna Board of Trade – urges the removal of all Japanese nationals.

Individual – believes Japanese Canadians are loyal to Japan.

Individual from Sweetwater – wants enemy aliens to build highways in the Peace River district.

January 16: Corporation of the District of Summerland Council – opposes moving "orientals or enemy aliens" into the Okanagan Valley.

Summerland Local of the British Columbia Fruit Growers – opposes the movement of Japanese into the Okanagan Valley.

Victoria Kinsmen – urge the removal of all Japanese "of both sexes regardless of place of birth to some place east of the Rocky Mountains" and their detention in work camps where they would be "unable to do any harm to our country or its people."

President of the Defence of Canada League, "a 100% Canadian organization composed of native born whites" – demands the complete removal of all Japanese.

Prince Rupert Chamber of Commerce – urges the use of Japanese labour in the construction of local highways.

British Columbia Fruit Growers, Naramata Local – opposes the use of Japanese labour in fruit and vegetable districts of the Okanagan Valley "except under military supervision".

January 17: Individual – urges the removal of all Japanese east of the Rocky Mountains placing one family in each town with the town to police them.

January 19: "White farmers of the District of the Fraser Valley" (no

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

number) – urge B.C. M.L.A.'s to legislate against the renting of land or the growing of crops by "Japanese" while acknowledging that Japanese Canadians are "peaceful law-abiding citizens" but are "an unassimilable enemy race."

January 20: Canadian Longshoremen's Association, Local No. 2, Prince Rupert – urges the removal of Japanese Canadians "not with any intention of creating any racial trouble or otherwise. ... one potential fifth columnist can do more damage than all the rest put together, however well meaning the rest of the Japanese may be."

Individual from Vancouver writes that the campaign against the Japanese parallels Nazi campaigns against the Jews and urging imprisonment for persons promoting racial discrimination.

January 21: Individual – suggests that rabble rousers be dealt with under the Criminal Code.

Matsqui Berry Growers' meeting protests statements by a B.C. M.P. that they employ Japanese pickers.

January 22: Winfield Farmers Institute, Kelowna – opposes sending Japanese to the Okanagan.

Canadian Pensioners Association of the Great War, Victoria Branch – claims "all Japanese are unreliable" and that none should be allowed into the armed forces.

January 23: Sons of England Benefit Society, Kelowna – opposes moving Japanese to the Okanagan.

Kelowna City Council – opposes sending Japanese to the Okanagan.

January 24: 7th Co. Fourandex of Canada, Vancouver – urges the government to remove the danger of attack from local Japanese.

January 26: Central Alberta Beet Workers' Union, Local 103, Lethbridge, Alberta – protests any plan to send Japanese labourers to Alberta.

January 27: George H. Ross, Member of Parliament for Calgary East – wants Japanese labour to work on the Banff-Jasper highway.

January 27: Anoymous letter – threatens to shoot all Japanese in Victoria.

January 28: Individual – questions the wisdom of Japanese being permitted to remain in B.C.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

January 31:	A Logging Company, Timmins, Ontario – wants Japanese workers.
	Combined meeting of the British Columbia Fruit Growers Association, Summerland Local, the Summerland Municipal Council, the Summerland Board of Trade and the Summerland Canadian Legion – opposes the movement of Japanese labour into their district.
	Individual – wants all Japanese removed.
February 4:	Port Arthur Trade and Labour Council, Port Arthur, Ontario opposes the removal of Japanese Canadians from the Pacific Coast as "unnecessary, unwanted and unwarranted."
	West Burnaby Liberal Association – urges the removal of Japanese Canadians.
	British Columbia Fruit Growners Association, Vernon – demands legislation prohibiting Japanese Canadians from buying or renting land.
February 5:	Saanich Fruit Growers Association – urge their M.L.A.'s to pass legislation excluding Japanese from farming because the Japanese have "proved themselves absolutely unfit to be allowed equal rights with White men".
	Lumby C.C.F. Club (Vernon) – object to the importation of Japanese into the Okanagan if they will be in competition with white labour unless they are under government control.
	Kamloops Municipal Council – opposes the movement of Japanese to the Okanagan.
February 6:	Sudbury C.C.F., Sudbury, Ontario – opposes the use of Japanese labour if other labour is available and requests that all Japanese be put in internment camps.
	Fraser Valley Milk Producers, Abbottsford, (2500) – urge the removal of Japanese from near power installations and water supplies.
February 6:	North Burnaby Liberal Association – urges the seizure of Japanese property, deportation of Japanese Canadians after the war, internment for the duration of the war, and the immediate cancellation of trade licences.
February 9:	Individual forwards newspaper clippings alleging attempts at sabotage by Japanese Americans at Portland, Oregon.
February 13:	Executive of the Fraternal Council of British Columbia – urges the removal of all residents of Japanese racial origin to Central Canada.
February 14:	Native Sons of Canada, Assembly No. 1, Victoria – urges the

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

government be guided by B.C. M.P.'s as the present arrangements "fall far short of the requirements."

Individual – alleges that Japanese in Whonnock are "sneering at" the Canadian government.

Victoria City Council – urges the removal of "all persons of enemy races" from the Pacific Coast.

February 15:

Executive of the British Columbia Council of Women – urges the removal of Japanese Canadians.

Individual – wants an immediate evacuation of all Japanese regardless of age or sex.

An individual A.R.P. Warden, Victoria – urges the internment of all Japanese.

February 17:

City Council of Duncan – urges removal of "all persons of enemy race."

Individual from North Vancouver – writes supporting Japanese Canadians.

Individual from Vancouver – wants all Japanese removed from the coast.

Individual member of the Liberal Party – urges the removal of all Japanese on a "safety first" principle.

February 18:

Municipal Council of Kelowna – urges strict supervision of Japanese Canadians and a prohibition of land purchases by them.

West Vancouver Lions Club – urges the removal of Japanese Canadians.

Citizens' Committee of the Fraser Valley, Mission City (no number) urges the immediate removal of "all enemy aliens especially of Japanese origin."

February 19:

North Vancouver Board of Trade ("a large meeting") – urges the total removal of all Japanese.

Individual – writes "remove these Japs men, women and children from our coast."

Canadian Legion, Mission City – urges removal of all Japanese and enemy aliens.

Huntingdon Women's Institute – urges removal of Japanese "from the vicinity of the Fraser River and bridge without delay".

Prince Rupert Chamber of Commerce – urges the removal of all Japanese.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

February 20:

Okanagan Valley Municipal Association, composed of 13 member councils – urges an organized evacuation of Japanese Canadians and a prohibition on property ownership by Japanese.

Individual – expresses belief that "all Japs are a potential and real danger.

Individual – writes that the "Yellow Peril is still on our coast"

Individual – expressed belief that all Japanese are a menace.

Individual – alleges that Japanese have equipment hidden and "will be prepared to help those attacking."

Vancouver–Burrard Liberal Association – urges immediate removal of all enemy nationals.

Executive of the Canadian Corps Association – urges removal of "male and female Japanese and other aliens" to east of the Cascade Mountains.

Executive of the Victoria Women's Canadian Club – urges removal of all Japanese.

Kamloops and District Liberal Association – urges that land purchases by Japanese Canadians be prohibited.

Conservative M.L.A., Macgregor MacIntosh – urges removal of all Japanese. "local Japanese of all categories are becoming more arrogant and white citizens comparing measures taken by the United States on their Pacific Coast with lack of decision here are preparing to take drastic action themselves."

Mayor, Port Alberni – urges "definite action."

Lynmour–Dollarton Liberal Association – urges internment of all Japanese.

British Columbia Poultry Industries Committee – urges removal of all Japanese.

Canadian Brotherhood of Railroad Employees – protests failure to remove enemy aliens from the coast.

Resolution read (no indication of a vote) by the Chinese Ambassador to Washington, D.C., at a Victory Loan luncheon sponsored by the Vancouver Board of Trade, the Canadian Club and Vancouver Service Clubs – demands the evacuation of all enemy aliens and all Japanese.

February 21:

Kamloops City Council – urges the internment of all male Japanese of military age and an orderly evacuation under strict government supervision.

National Drivers' Union, Local No. 1 – urges removal of all Japanese.

Canadian Legion, Gibson's Landing – urges immediate removal of all Japanese.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

	Reeve, Haney – telegrams re planned indignation meeting.
	Individual – alleges Japanese will massacre thousands of Canadians.
February 23:	Vancouver Real Estate Exchange ("a full meeting") – demands immediate action to remove all enemy aliens and all Japanese born or naturalized in Canada regardless of age or sex.
	Trail City Council – urges removal of all persons of enemy races.
	Conference of Women's Organizations (no identity, no numbers) – urges removal of all Japanese "as race riots likely."
	Gyro Club of Vancouver – urges immediate removal of all Japanese.
	Women's Christian Temperance Union, Vancouver District – asks that if Japanese Canadians must be evacuated that it be humane.
February 24:	Prince Rupert Women's Canadian Club – urges total evacuation of all Japanese Canadians.
	Citizens' Defence Committee, Vancouver, (24 "prominent citizens") – urges removal of all Japanese.
	Women's Auxiliary, Canadian Legion, Branch 60 (Vancouver–West Vancouver) – urges removal of all Japanese.
February 25:	Rate Payers Association, Mission – urges removal of all Japanese.
	Nicomen Island Rate Payers Association – urges removal of all Japanese.
February 26 – 27:	Identical resolutions from four locals of the Women's Auxilary, Canadian Legion: Sooke Branch, Local No. 54; Armstrong Branch; Nanimo Branch; Kamloops Branch.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Conference on Japanese Problems in B.C., January 8 - 9, 1942
[illegible] External Affairs Files 733 - B - 40 - C.

The Decision to Uproot Japanese Canadians

The January Conference

Conference on Japanese Problems, **Minutes**, p. 6, Dept. of External Affairs File 773-B-40C, E.A.A.

This Conference, held in Ottawa on January 8 and 9, 1942, was attended by representatives of the military, police, civil service, the Standing Committee on Orientals which included two very anti-Asian politicans, the Provincial Secretary of British Columbia and four Cabinet Ministers included Ian Mackenzie who chaired it. These Minutes were prepared by the Department of External Affairs and are a better reflection of what occured than the official report submitted by Ian Mackenzie.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

III. Introductory Statements.

1. At the first meeting the Chairman made an opening statement on the purpose of the Conference. He said that the Government had received numerous representations concerning the problem of persons of Japanese racial origin in British Columbia. One particularly important question was whether fishing licences should be issued to persons of Japanese racial origin. The chief purpose of the meeting was to allay apprehension in British Columbia. This must, however, be done in such a way as to minimize the possibility of retaliation by the Japanese against Canadian prisoners of war and against the coast of British Columbia. The Chairman paid a tribute to the work done by the various committees appointed in the past few years and to the work of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

2. Mr. Angus outlined in the sense of Section 1B of the Agenda the peculiar position of the Japanese population in Canada which is unlike that of the German and Italian population in several ways.

3. Mr. Keenleyside summarized the steps which had been taken by the Federal Government in recent years to deal with the problem. He went back to the riots in Vancouver in 1907, the subsequent establishment of the Japanese immigration quota which was gradually reduced until by 1930 it was limited to 150 persons of special categories. He pointed out that in recent years the quota had been ~~more than~~ filled so that the problem, even before the outbreak of war with Japan, was not one of immigration but of working out satisfactory relations between the permanent Japanese residents of Canada and other residents of Canada. This had become more difficult ever since 1931 because of the constantly widening area of Japanese aggression. An Interdepartmental Committee under Dr. Skelton had been constituted in 1937 and in the following year a Board of Review had been set up to investigate illegal entries. The Board had found that there were a very large number of illegal entrants in the early 20's, but that by 1933 very few illegal entrants remained in British Columbia, and that since then entry had been carefully controlled. Public opinion, however, in British Columbia remained disturbed, especially after Japan entered into an alliance with Germany and Italy in September, 1940. A Special Committee was therefore appointed on October 1 of that year. Mr. Keenleyside drew attention to its report which had been published in December, 1940, and especially to the summary and the recommendations. The recommendations had been approved of by the Canadian Government and had largely been the basis of the Government's actions since. Under recommendation 7 a registration had been made and under recommendation 8 a small Standing Committee had been set up in British Columbia under Mayor Hume to supervise the carrying out of those recommendations of the Committee which were adopted by the Government.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

4. Mr. Keenleyside outlined in the sense of Part 3 of the Agenda the basic principles on which Canadian policy has been and should be based. He drew particular attention to the fourth principle, "the coordination of Canadian and United States policies". He said that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had recommended that the two governments should do their utmost to synchronize their policies since their problems were almost identical. He referred also to the statement made by the Prime Minister in his broadcast speech made on the day following the outbreak of war with Japan. A somewhat similar statement had been made by President Roosevelt in which the President had appealed to employers not to discriminate against aliens and foreign born citizens. He also referred to a statement by the Attorney General of the United States on the necessity of showing tolerance to enemy aliens resident in the United States. On the whole the actions taken against persons of Japanese origin, even in Hawaii, had been less rigorous than those taken by Canada.

5. Mayor Hume then reported on the activities of the Standing Committee which had been appointed almost exactly a year ago. He said that the Japanese had been re-registered and that while re-registration was being made a considerable number had left Canada. When war broke out with Japan the Committee recommended:

1. That Japanese newspapers be closed down. As a result of this recommendation the Royal Canadian Mounted Police suggested to the Japanese that this be done and the Japanese agreed.

2. That Japanese language schools be closed. This also was done by agreement.

3. That the Royal Canadian Mounted Police pick up disloyal Japanese.

4. That the Japanese fishing fleet be laid up.

The three last recommendations had been made effective. Mayor Hume concluded by saying that the public in British Columbia was demanding that the Japanese be removed from the coastal area.

6. Assistant Commissioner F. J. Mead of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police made a report on the existing situation. He said that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had received excellent cooperation from the leaders of the Japanese population. These leaders had cooperated in the registration and since the outbreak of the war with Japan had pointed out to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Japanese who should be interned as dangerous. As evidence of the excellent attitude of the Japanese population he read three paragraphs from an operative's report of a secret

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

meeting of Japanese fishermen in Vancouver which had taken place recently. The fishermen at the meeting had stated that they realized that the seizure of the Japanese fishing fleet was inevitable under war conditions. Since the outbreak of the war it had been necessary to intern only one Japanese because of disloyal remarks.

IV. Discussion on general principles set out in Item 3 of the Agenda and discussions of the application of these general principles to specific problems as outlined in the Agenda.

A full and frank discussion took place at all three meetings of the Conference. The result of these discussions is embodied in the report of the Conference. In addition to the matters mentioned in the report the following matters of special interest were brought up in the discussion:

1. Commissioner Wood and Assistant Commissioner Mead of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police reported that they had recently been in touch with Mr. Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who reported that the F.B.I. had received no evidence of disloyalty by the Japanese in the United States, Hawaii or the Philippines: espionage had been committed only by persons attached to the Consulates; there was in the United States no important demand that Japanese residents should be moved from the coast.

2. Mr. Whitmore of the Department of Fisheries stated that if fishing licences were refused to the Japanese he did not expect that there would be an influx of many new fishermen, though a few more Indians would probably take out fishing licences. The explanation of this was that in the past the fisheries had been over-staffed. If not enough fish were being caught the Department could take steps to remedy the situation, as, for example, by reducing the weekly close period or by permitting the use of a different type of fishing gear. He warned, however, that there would be a temporary local shortage of certain types of fish.

3. Mayor Hume reported that the Fishermen's Union had stated to him that they would guarantee that they could get the required amount of fish even if the Japanese were not issued licences and that the canneries had informed him that they could manage without Japanese in the canneries. The canners had also said that they would be willing to buy up the Japanese rights in the fishing boats. The Conference, however, agreed that it would be undesirable to permit the canneries to monopolize ownership of the fishing boats.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

4. It was clear from reports by members of the Conference who had recently come from British Columbia that a serious unemployment situation was being created in British Columbia among the population of Japanese origin. It was not merely a question of unemployed fishermen but persons of Japanese origin in British Columbia were also being dismissed from lumbering, gardening, and domestic service.

5. The members of the Conference who had just arrived from British Columbia found it difficult to accept the assurances of the representatives of the Armed Services and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that the measures which had already been taken in British Columbia or which were recommended by a majority of the members of the Conference would be sufficient to meet the requirements of national defence and security. Most of them stated that they did not trust persons of Japanese racial origin and that they considered the continued presence of these persons in British Columbia a menace to public safety. They emphasized particularly their fear that virtually all of these residents would commit positive acts of disloyalty if Japan should land forces in British Columbia. Even, however, if the assurances of the Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were accepted a serious situation would still continue to exist in British Columbia since it would be impossible to persuade the majority of the people of British Columbia that the Japanese residents did not constitute a menace. The people of British Columbia were definitely alarmed by the Japanese menace. ✗ [There is grave danger that anti-Japanese riots may break out and that it will be necessary to call out the troops to defend Japanese residents from attack by other Canadians.] The Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Commissioner of the British Columbia Provincial Police agreed that there was a distinct possibility of anti-Japanese riots in Vancouver and General Pope stated that General Alexander had reported to Defence Headquarters that public security in British Columbia may be endangered by the feeling of the white population against the Japanese.

6. ✗ [Mr. Couper of the Department of Labour and other members of the Conference from Ottawa emphasized that if Canada was to make the utmost possible contribution to victory in the war it was necessary to make the most effective use of the abilities of all residents of Canada including persons of Japanese racial origin. They based their contention on the impending labour shortage in Canada and argued that racial discrimination was not only unjust but inefficient and thus affected detrimentally Canada's war effort.] The members of the Conference from British Columbia found it difficult to believe that there was an impending labour shortage in Canada

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

since they stated there was considerable unemployment existing at the present time in British Columbia.

7. This difference of opinion over the urgency of the manpower problem in Canada was in part the reason for the difference of opinion between members of the Conference over whether it would be useful and desirable to impress on employers and labour alike throughout Canada the importance, from the point of view of the national war effort, of not discharging or refusing to hire or refusing to work with persons of Japanese origin. Members from British Columbia stated that the public in British Columbia was so convinced that the Japanese were untrustworthy and constituted a menace that white workmen would refust to work with workmen of Japanese racial origin in spite of any appeal which the Government might make.

8. The possibility of Japan using Canadian treatment of Japanese as an excuse for retaliation against Canadians and other allied nationals under Japanese control was discussed at some length. Mr. J. E. Read, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, pointed out that Japan was not bound by the Hague Convention and that Canadian prisoners of war in Japan did not, therefore, have the protection of that Convention. Apart, however, from the Convention, the experience of the war hitherto was that both sides gave to prisoners of the other, treatment which was pretty well equivalent to the treatment which their own nationals were being given. If Japan believed that Canada was mistreating Japanese nationals it would probably retaliate, not only against Canadians but against other British subjects and nationals of others of the United Nations. Mr. Keenleyside pointed out that the Commonwealth Governments had tried to follow a common policy of treatment of enemy nationals and that should the Canadian Government decide in favour of a policy of wholesale internment of Japanese nationals the Government, before taking such action, would probably consult with the Government of the United Kingdom. He felt that it was likely that the Government of the United Kingdom would urge Canada not to take such action. Japanese nationals in Canada constituted the largest group of Japanese nationals in the British Commonwealth and it was in the interests of the whole Commonwealth that Japanese nationals in Canada should be made use of to the greatest possible extent in order to secure good treatment for British nationals who fall into Japanese hands.

9. At the request of Mr. R. W. Baldwin of the Office of the Press Censor it was agreed that a Standing Subcommittee of the Conference should be established with which Press Censorhsip could consult. ~~This~~ This Committee would consist of Mr. Angus and of a member nominated by the Defence Departments.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

10. The members of the Conference agreed that no publicity should be given to the proceedings or recommendations of the Conference until the Government had dealt with the Conference's recommendations. Mr. Ian Mackenzie stated that he would arrange that they should be dealt with by Cabinet on Monday or Tuesday, January 12 or 13.

11. During the course of the discussions telegrams and letters were read to the Conference from various associations and individuals in British Columbia. Some of these communications were addressed to the Prime Minister, others to individual members of the Conference.

12. While the proposal to remove all persons of Japanese racial origin from the Pacific coast was dropped by general agreement, the British Columbia representatives demanded that able bodied adult male Japanese nationals should be removed. They appeared to be willing to make an exception for those whose applications for naturalization under section 8 of the Naturalization Act were outstanding. In making this demand they emphasized that in their opinion it was the minimum necessary to satisfy the people of British Columbia and prevent riots and it was pointed out that the assurances of the Armed Forces and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police did not extend to denying the dangers of anti-Japanese rioting.

13. At the conclusion of the Conference, when it was clear that the Conference could not agree unanimously on measures which should be taken to control Japanese nationals in British Columbia, Mr. Pearson, as representative of the Government of British Columbia, stated that he wished to make it clear that if the Government of Canada ignores the views of the representatives of British Columbia they could not expect the Government of British Columbia to be enthusiastic or very effective in trying to "sell" the ideas supported by the Dominion Government to the people of British Columbia. In that event it would be necessary for the Government of Canada to try to sell their ideas to the people of British Columbia. The Government of Canada, however, could be assured that whatever decision it made, the Government of British Columbia would do their best to see that things go along peacefully in British Columbia.

14. At the conclusion of the meeting the Chairman, the Honourable Ian Mackenzie, thanked all the members of the Conference for their participation in its discussions. He thanked especially members of the Conference who had come all the way from British Columbia to attend. In reply Mayor Hume expressed the thanks of the British Columbia members to the other members of the Conference, especially to the Chairman and to Mr. Keenleyside and Mr. Angus.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

10. The members of the Conference agreed that no publicity should be given to the proceedings or recommendations of the Conference until the Government had dealt with the Conference's recommendations. Mr. Ian Mackenzie stated that he would arrange that they should be dealt with by Cabinet on Monday or Tuesday, January 12 or 13.

11. During the course of the discussions telegrams and letters were read to the Conference from various associations and individuals in British Columbia. Some of these communications were addressed to the Prime Minister, others to individual members of the Conference.

12. While the proposal to remove all persons of Japanese racial origin from the Pacific coast was dropped by general agreement, the British Columbia representatives demanded that able bodied adult male Japanese nationals should be removed. They appeared to be willing to make an exception for those whose applications for naturalization under section 8 of the Naturalization Act were outstanding. In making this demand they emphasized that in their opinion it was the minimum necessary to satisfy the people of British Columbia and prevent riots and it was pointed out that the assurances of the Armed Forces and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police did not extend to denying the dangers of anti-Japanese rioting.

13. At the conclusion of the Conference, when it was clear that the Conference could not agree unanimously on measures which should be taken to control Japanese nationals in British Columbia, Mr. Pearson, as representative of the Government of British Columbia, stated that he wished to make it clear that if the Government of Canada ignores the views of the representatives of British Columbia they could not expect the Government of British Columbia to be enthusiastic or very effective in trying to "sell" the ideas supported by the Dominion Government to the people of British Columbia. In that event it would be necessary for the Government of Canada to try to sell their ideas to the people of British Columbia. The Government of Canada, however, could be assured that whatever decision it made, the Government of British Columbia would do their best to see that things go along peacefully in British Columbia.

14. At the conclusion of the meeting the Chairman, the Honourable Ian Mackenzie, thanked all the members of the Conference for their participation in its discussions. He thanked especially members of the Conference who had come all the way from British Columbia to attend. In reply Mayor Hume expressed the thanks of the British Columbia members to the other members of the Conference, especially to the Chairman and to Mr. Keenleyside and Mr. Angus.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Pat's comments on red pencil

Nat.

The Politicians' Position

Ian Mackenzie to W.L.M. King, January 10, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

Conference on the Japanese Problem in B.C., **Report**, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81, P.A.C.

The letter from Ian Mackenzie to Prime Minister King illustrates Mackenzie's tactics in Cabinet. Throwing his political weight behind the position of the minority at the conference; ie, the B.C. politicians who wanted to intern all Japanese nationals, Mackenzie undermines the rejection of that demand by the military and police by quoteing out of context the opinions of the General Officer Commanding on the Pacific Coast, Maj-Gen. R. O. Alexander. The comments on the letter and the report are by Prime Minister King.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

PM's comments on red pencil

A → P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL 10th January, 1942

My dear Prime Minister,-

For the last two days we had a committee, consisting of about thirty members, considering every phase of the Japanese problem in British Columbia. The Committee consisted of representatives of --

External Affairs;
The Navy and the Army;
The Provincial Government of British Columbia;
The Mounted Police;
The Provincial Police of British Columbia;
The Department of Labour, and other departments of the Government; and
The Standing Committee on Oriental Problems in British Columbia (the Chairman of which is Mayor Hume of New Westminster);
with
Mr. Michaud and myself.

It was immediately evident that there was a marked difference of opinion between the Standing Committee from British Columbia, together with the Provincial Government, and the officials of the various departments, including the Services, in Ottawa. We were able to arrive at unanimous conclusions in regard to the question of fishing licenses and fishing boats, radios and cameras, but the real difficulty arose on the question of evacuation.

I agree I agree Government

I may say that although the Committee recommended that Canadian nationals of Japanese origin be permitted to volunteer in the Canadian army, and also that they should be called up under the National Mobilization Act, the Committee was rather lukewarm about this recommendation. The Standing Committee was opposed to it and the opinion was expressed that the public of British Columbia were not in favour of it.

Therefore, in regard to that specific recommendation - if you feel inclined to be opposed to it, I would not urge it very strongly on the Government.

The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
O t t a w a.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

The real difference of opinion arose, however, in regard to the question of the evacuation of Japanese nationals. There are of these about 3,500. Of these, 1,714 are between the ages of 18 and 45 years, and I would estimate that from about 2,000 to 2,500 are able-bodied, adult males.

[You will observe that the majority report did not support, for the reasons stated, a policy of evacuation. On the contrary, Mr. Pearson for the Provincial Government, Mayor Hume and some members of his committee, named in the report, spoke very emphatically in favour of it and, therefore, rather than divide the Committee and cause, possibly, unfortunate consequences, I suggested that both the majority and the minority decisions be referred to Council. I personally have no doubt whatsoever as to what the opinion is in British Columbia -- the opinion of British Columbia is with the minority report.

I believe that under a wise and prudent policy of consideration, these could be transferred either to the interior parts of British Columbia, for useful, constructive work in camps without necessarily being interned but being under surveillance, or to parts outside of British Columbia where they could be very usefully employed on road work in connection with defence. There is a gap in the road between Terrace and Prince Rupert that, in my opinion, should be completed, thus being of great benefit to the defence of the northern portions of the province. There is also, when the weather clears, a gap to be completed in the Hope-Princeton highway which would be of great importance if the bridge on the Fraser Canyon happened to be destroyed.]

My suggestion is that you immediately appoint someone possessed of ability and discretion and, if Council decides upon this policy, place him in charge not only of the formation of the Civilian Pioneer Corps recommended, but also in charge of the placement on constructive works away from the Coast of those who could not be absorbed in the Civilian Pioneer Corps. Perhaps the name of Brigadier Foster, who is mentioned as Minister to Tokyo, would be useful in that regard.

O.K.

In connection with the disposal of the Japanese boats, seeing that they are Canadian citizens in the main, I would recommend a committee to be set up of, say, three members, to dispose of these boats either by sale, lease or charter. I think possibly one of the committee should be a member of the Japanese who is a Canadian national. I recommend, as the best man to head this committee, Commander B. L. Johnson, now serving with the Navy here in Ottawa, but who could be released for this purpose. He has been in British Columbia for forty-seven years and knows the Japanese situation thoroughly.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

The only place where the element of compulsion might have to come in would be in connection with the evacuation of some of the Japanese nationals. As you are aware, the Canadian nationals of Japanese origin have all volunteered to serve anywhere and in any capacity. I enclose copies of three telegrams received from them yesterday.

This is a question of great urgency in my opinion and Council should deal with it either on Monday or give it priority on Tuesday. I have called a meeting of the Reconstruction Committee for Monday afternoon at 2.30. This will take only about an hour and perhaps it might be possible to have Council called after that to deal only with this very important Japanese problem.

What I fear is that, unless we take immediate action, our white people may resort to unwise tactics in Vancouver. The Standing Committee state that they will not return until Council has rendered a decision. They asked that they be allowed to appear before the Cabinet but I replied that Cabinet was not receiving any delegation. Then they asked me if Mayor Hume, who is a very loyal supporter, could see you personally. I said I did not know -- possibly you might see him for five minutes before Council met -- and would mention the matter to you.

That is the situation as clearly as I see it, and I would strongly urge the Government taking immediate action and making its policy public.

Yours sincerely,

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

MEMORANDUM

1. Speed is essential.

2. See extract from letter from General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command.

3. See extract from Navy letter.

4. Remove male population from Coastal area.

5. Organize into units for gainful employment based upon set-up of "Pioneer Units" of last war.

6. (a) Nationals - Compulsory
   (b) Naturalized - Volunteer
   (c) Canadian Born - Volunteer
   (d) Ex-service men - Volunteer

   } Into No. 5

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Extracts from Secret letter from Major-General R. O. Alexander, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command, addressed to Chief of the General Staff at Ottawa, under date of December 30, 1941

"2. I fully realize the various angles of the situation and that any action which we might take against local Japanese, which is not completely humane and in conformity with the Geneva Convention, might be taken as an excuse by Japan to deal harshly with our own prisoners. I feel, however, that internment of Japanese males between the ages of 18 and 45, their removal from the coast and their organization into paid units on public works or some similar employment would be advisable.

"3. I discussed the matter yesterday with the Premier of British Columbia, who entirely concurs in the above views. I have this date also discussed the matter with Lieut.-Col. Sparling, who is a member of the Standing Committee on Oriental Affairs, who informs me that similar views are held by his committee and that recommendations are going forward to the Prime Minister along these lines.

"6. Immediate action along the lines as suggested above and in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Oriental Affairs might prevent inter-racial riots and bloodshed, and will undoubtedly do a great deal to calm the local population."

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Secret

Extract from/letter from Commodore W.J.R. Beech, Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, addressed to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command; The Officer-in-Charge, "E" Company, R.C.M.P., Vancouver; and The Commissioner, B.C. Provincial Police, under date of December 27, 1941

"9. Public opinion is very much against the Japanese all over the Queen Charlotte Islands and in view of the strategic position of these Islands I would strongly recommend that all the Japanese be removed."

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

I

The Conference endorses the following principles which underlie Canadian policy in relation to the Japanese problem and by which, in its opinion, all proposals in relation to this matter should be judged:-

A - National defence and victory are the first and overriding considerations.

B - In so far as it may be compatible with the requirements of national defence, Canadians of Japanese racial origin and Japanese nationals resident in Canada shall be treated with justice and consideration.

C - Every feasible step shall be taken to encourage the maintenance of a calm and reasonable attitude among Canadian citizens generally, and it shall again be made known that the full force of the law will be invoked to prevent anti-Japanese demonstrations and to protect Canadian residents of Japanese race.

D - No action shall be taken or allowed which would give any possible excuse to the Japanese Government for mistreating Canadians under Japanese control, or which would help the Japanese in their

FOLDER NO. 7

present efforts to arouse Asiatic hostility against the white race.

E - The Canadian and United States authorities should continue to coordinate their policies in relation to persons of Japanese racial origin within their respective jurisdictions.

OK
K

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

II

In accordance with the foregoing principles the Conference recommends that, during the period of the war, for reasons of national defence and security, the Canadian Government should take the following steps:-

A - Prohibit all persons of Japanese racial origin from fishing or serving on fishing vessels or other vessels operated by Japanese off the coast of British Columbia.

B - Strictly control the sale of gasoline and of blasting powder to persons of Japanese racial origin, under conditions to be prescribed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

C - Prohibit the possession or use by Japanese nationals of short-wave radio receiving sets, radio transmitters and cameras.

D - Continue intensive surveillance of Japanese nationals.

JK/K

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

III

The Conference recommends that, for the furtherance of the Canadian war effort, the Canadian Government should take the following steps:-

A - Accept at once the offers of various groups of Canadians of Japanese race to perform wartime service for Canada.

OK

B - Organize for the foregoing purpose a Civilian Corps of Canadian Japanese to be used on projects of value to the national cause, and take such other action as will make most effective use of the abilities of Canadian residents of Japanese race,

OK

C - Encourage the enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces, for service outside British Columbia, of Canadian nationals of Japanese racial origin; and call up under the terms of the National Resources Mobilization Act, for service outside British Columbia, all Canadian nationals of Japanese racial origin properly subject to the provisions of the said Act.

?

No

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

D - Arrange through the immediate establishment of a special office in British Columbia for the sale, lease, requisition or charter, on equitable terms and to suitable persons, of fishing or other vessels and fishing equipment heretofore used or owned by Canadians of Japanese racial origin, and now immobilized on the Pacific Coast.

OK

E - Emphasize to the white fishermen and canners on the Pacific Coast that they must accept responsibility for seeing that the removal of the Japanese fishermen does not reduce the total of fish caught or increase the prices at which the catch is made available to Canada, the United Kingdom and the Allied nations.

OK if possible

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

IV

The Conference considered a proposal that all Japanese nationals (or at least all males between 18 and 45) now resident in Canadian territory on or near the Coast of British Columbia, be compulsorily removed to areas lying east of the Rocky mountains. The majority of the Conference did not accept this proposal, for the following reasons:-

A - The representatives of the Department of National Defence, National Defence for Naval Services, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police assured the Conference that the requirements of national defence and security can be met by the measures already taken or recommended, and do not warrant such action.

B - The acceptance of this proposal would be a contradiction of Canadian and Allied professions of justice and humanity.

C - Officers of the Department of External Affairs informed the Conference that in their opinion action of the kind proposed would almost certainly result in cruel retaliation by the Japanese authorities

OK

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

against Canadians now in their power; and further that such action at this stage would result in the dissipation of the strongest guarantee now possessed by Canada, and the remainder of the British Commonwealth, of continued good treatment for Canadian nationals and British subjects who have or may come under Japanese control.

D - Acceptance of this proposal would result in the Canadian Government following a policy wholly at variance with that being followed by the United States Government under similar or more difficult circumstances in the western States and Hawaii.

In spite of the assurances mentioned in A above, the Honourable G. S. Pearson, Minister of Labour, and Provincial Secretary of British Columbia; His Worship Mayor F. J. Hume, of New Westminster, B.C., Chairman of the Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia; Lieut.-Colonel Macgregor Macintosh, and Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Sparling, Members of the Standing Committee on Orientals in British Columbia; and Mr. T.W.S. Parsons, Commissioner of the British Columbia Provincial Police, all of whom who had come from British Columbia to Ottawa for this Conference, realizing that there will be difficulty in satisfying the residents of British

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Columbia that there is no need to fear subversive activities on the part of Japanese nationals in British Columbia, agreed on the following recommendations:-

1. That arrangements be made by the Canadian Government for the removal of able-bodied adult male Japanese nationals from the coastal area of British Columbia, and that employment of a suitable character be provided for them under conditions which may be considered reasonable under the circumstances; in areas and under conditions which will assure their removal from any suspicion of possibility of subversive activities.

OK

2. That where the circumstances reasonably permit, women and children be allowed to accompany the head of the family.

OK

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

V

Finally the Conference, recognizing the great anxieties imposed on the people of British Columbia as a result of the dangers created by war with Japan, recommends that the Canadian Government should endeavour to secure the full cooperation of the Government of British Columbia, and should make known to the public the details of its policy in relation to the Japanese problem by the following means:-

A - A statement by radio to the people of British Columbia by the Prime Minister of Canada.

No

B - One or two explanatory statements over the radio by participants in this Conference in which the various considerations presented and the reasons for the recommendations made, will be clearly discussed.

C - Full and complete "off-the-record" discussions with representatives of the press and radio to be held in Victoria, Vancouver and Ottawa, and to be participated in by Members of the Standing Committee, representatives of the Armed Services, and of the Department of External Affairs, with the cooperation of the Director of Public Information.

This should be first step

K

This statement of government policy given to the press - but not radio

K

FOLDER NO. 7

HLK

January 26, 1942

THE JAPANESE PROBLEM

The Position of the Military, Police and Department of External Affairs

Summary of Memorandum, Vice Chief of General Staff to Chief of General Staff, January 13, 1942, extracted from HQS 7368, vol 1, Defence Records, 322.009(D358), Directorate of History, Department of National Defence.

Memorandum, Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to Ian Mackenzie and W.L.M. King, January 26, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 32, file x-81(2), P.A.C.

Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, February 19, 1942, J.L. Ralston Papers, MGIIIB11, Vol. 37, P.A.C.

Canada, Cabinet War Committee, **Minutes**, February 26, 1942, RG 2/16, vol. 8, P.A.C.

The first document is a summary of the comments of Maurice A. Pope Vice Chief of General Staff, upon the receipt of a telegram from Maj-Gen. R.O. Alexander supporting the position of the B.C. politicians at the ' Ottawa Conference who wanted to intern all male Japanese Canadians of military age.

The second document illustrates the constant attempts being made by Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside and Henry F. Angus, among others, at the Department of External Affairs to defuse the demands of British Columbia's Members of Parliament.

The third document is the Appreciation of the military situation facing Canada prepared by the Chiefs of Staff for the Minister of National Defence on February 19, 1942, five days before the decision to remove Japanese Canadians from their homes on the Pacific Coast.

The fourth document is an extract from the Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee Meeting of February 26, 1942. It is virtually unheard of in Canadian history for the military to refuse to undertake a task when requested to do so by the Cabinet and is only possible in this case because the Minister of National Defence supported that refusal.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

HLK

January 26, 1942

THE JAPANESE PROBLEM

Source. 322.009 (D358) Hist.

6-0-7

HQS. 7368 Vol 1

13 Jan 42.

Japanese - Pac. Coast

On receipt of telegram from Joint Services Committee (PC) (P.C. Tele. 663 d. 12 Jan 42) recommending "from point of view of defence" removal of all Jap and Axis male aliens between ages of 16 & 50 from coastal areas of B.C., the V.C.G.S. (Maj. Gen. Pope) in a memo to C.G.S. questions whether the removal was requested on the grounds of defence, or as stated in the G.O.C.-in-C's letter of 30 Dec 41. ; for the prevention of internal disorder and as a measure for the protection of the Japanese population against maltreatment by the public."

The V.C.G.S. is unable to agree to such a drastic step, as Vancouver is subject only to bombardment, and the Japanese, of whom 80% are Canadian Nationals, are unarmed. The F.B.I., through the Commissioner R.C.M.P. had advised the Inter-Departmental Committee at Ottawa re British Columbia "that the position in respect of Japanese on the West Coast of the U.S. was entirely satisfactory" and that both in Honolulu and at Manilla Japanese residents had been handled correctly from a U.S. point of view during the attacks on those places.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

HLK

January 26, 1942

THE JAPANESE PROBLEM

Throughout the Ottawa Conference on the Japanese Problems a clear distinction was maintained at all times between the principles to be applied in the treatment of the Japanese nationals and those to be followed in the case of the Canadian nationals and British subjects of Japanese race. It was agreed that compulsory evacuation should be enforced in regard to the Japanese nationals but no one at any time suggested - not even Colonel Macgregor Macintosh - that compulsion should be used in the case of the Canadian nationals.

In the memorandum which Mr. John Read, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, presented to Council on January 13th this distinction was further emphasized. Mr. Read wrote:-

> "Upon the assumption that there is going to be an evacuation I should like, most strongly, to urge that it should take the following form:
>
> (a) that there should be no compulsory evacuation or movement of British subjects irrespective of their racial origin."

Council appreciated and accepted the argument endorsed by the Conference and by Mr. Read and the distinction between the two groups of Japanese race was clearly maintained in the statement of Government policy which was issued on January 14th. In paragraph 10 it was stated that --

> "It is intended to organize a Civilian Corps of Canadian Japanese .... in order to utilize the services of the various groups of Canadian Japanese who have indicated their desire to serve."

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

In paragraph 12 the Government declared that --

"A separate organization will be created to provide opportunities for the employment of adult male enemy aliens outside the Protected Areas ...."

In paragraph 11 it was stated that --

"Subsequent to a date to be announced all enemy aliens (of whatever origin), except those who possess permits from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, will require to have moved from such Protected Areas in the Pacific Coast as may be defined."

In spite of the clear intentions of the Government there seems to have developed, since the arrival of the British Columbia members of Parliament in Ottawa, a belief that all persons of Japanese racial origin are to be treated alike; that Canadian nationals and British subjects as well as Japanese nationals are to be forced to move out of the Protected Areas unless they obtain Police permits to remain. This is greatly to be regretted as it may give rise to pressure on the Government to carry out a policy which the Government has already considered and, for reasons of the first importance, decided against.

Mr. Read has pointed out the serious implications of the adoption of any proposal to apply compulsion to the movement of Canadian nationals and British subjects. Recent and immediately prospective developments in the Orient have underlined certain aspects of this argument. The Japanese now hold in their power over two thousand Canadian prisoners of war and others. In addition they hold many thousand other British subjects and this number may be increased materially in the near future if present trends continue. Yet in spite of this situation certain persons are pressing the Canadian Government to compel certain Canadian nationals and British subjects to give up their homes and businesses and move hundreds of miles away from their established places of residence and labour simply because they are of Japanese racial origin. No

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

such proposals are suggested for other enemy aliens although persons of German and Italian descent are much more difficult to distinguish and watch. Any action of this kind based on purely racial grounds would immediately become known to the Japanese. Enquiries have already been made by the Japanese Government - through the protecting power, Spain - as to the meaning of recent Government decisions relating to the treatment of Japanese in Canada. Compulsory deportation of Canadian nationals, based on the colour of their skins, would be used for propaganda purposes throughout Asia, and would certainly be reflected in the treatment accorded Canadian and British prisoners in Japanese hands.

Moreover, such a programme is unnecessary. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police who know more about the situation on the Pacific Coast than anyone else are not alarmed by the terms of the Government's announced policy; on the contrary, they support it strongly. Everyone who participated in the Ottawa Conference is also on record as having approved that policy. If the Civilian Corps is properly handled and enlistment in it made reasonably attractive to the Canadian Japanese it will draw off a very substantial part of the able bodied adult males in this category. Yet to satisfy a few complainants who, though knowing less about the subject than do those who advised the Government in regard to the accepted policy, demand stronger action against the Canadian - Japanese community, it is proposed that the Government should rescind its decision and, to satisfy a relatively small proportion of the people of British Columbia, adopt another policy which, in addition to being inherently unjust, would place our fellow citizens who are now in Japanese hands in the greatest danger. In order to appease extreme opinion in British Columbia the Government is asked to place some two thousand residents of Winnipeg and Quebec in jeopardy.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

Ralston Papers. MG27 III B11

MOST SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF

APPRECIATION

19th February, 1942.

OBJECT

1. The object of this Appreciation is to discuss the probabilities and possibilities of attack on Canada.

PART I - GENERAL

PRESENT SITUATION

2. Except in the Russian theatre of war, the Axis Powers are on the offensive. In Russia, the Russian forces have achieved a significant but thus far limited winter success over the Germans along the entire front. The Russian advance is continuing but meeting stiffer resistance.

3. In Libya, following quickly upon a major British success, the Axis forces under General Rommel have taken the offensive and retrieved a large part of their losses. There are indications that the enemy offensive will continue to develop and there would appear to be a serious threat to Egypt.

4. In the Far East - Hong Kong, Guam, Wake, Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, Singapore and numerous islands have fallen. The United States forces are in a desperate state in the Philippines. The Dutch East Indies are under severe attack, and development of operations is in progress in Burma and towards Australia and the intermediate islands. In addition to the southwestern Pacific being dominated by the Japanese, considerable concern is felt over possible enemy action in the Indian Ocean.

5. Japanese sea power is predominant in the Western Pacific. The fall of Singapore has provided Japan with a large and powerfully defended base from which to operate her fleet in that area. The United States fleet, though inferior to the Japanese fleet in the Japanese Pacific, is superior to the Naval forces Japan could bring to bear in American Pacific waters. The main British fleet is engaged in Home waters, the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean.

6. The enemy is now concentrating his main submarine attack in the Western Atlantic.

7. The R.A.F. continue to maintain its offensive on occupied France and on Germany with the object of relieving German pressure on Russia, and as an anti-invasion measure.

.....2

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

PROBABLE ENEMY STRATEGY

8. Germany -- to defeat or contain Russia, either alone or in combination with Japan.

-- to defeat British forces in the Middle East.

-- to increase her activities against shipping in the Atlantic.

-- to contain as much of the main British and United States fleets as possible in Home waters.

-- invasion of British Isles.

Italy -- to deny the Mediterranean to the United Nations and assist in the Middle East campaign.

Japan -- to consolidate her gains in the Southwestern Pacific.

-- to prevent, by offensive action, reinforcements reaching the Southwestern Pacific theatre.

-- to make ineffective Chinese participation in the war by the denial of the Burma Road and direct attack on Chinese forces.

-- to retain sufficient forces in Manchuria and at home to counter possible Russian attack, or alternatively, to attack Russia.

-- to exploit her gains by extending operations towards Australasia, Burma and into the Indian Ocean thus, in the last case, threatening the British supply lines to the Middle East, India and the Far East.

-- to contain North American forces in America by raids on the North American Pacific Seaboard.

OTHER POSSIBLE ENEMY AIMS

9. Germany -- to include Vichy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey in the Axis orbit.

-- to carry out sporadic raids on Defended Ports, cities and defence installations, and to attack selected air targets on the east coast of North America.

-- invasion of the East Coast of North America.

.....3

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

OTHER POSSIBLE ENEMY AIMS (Cont'd.)

Japan -- to develop operations against Dutch Harbour in the Aleutian Islands with a view to the elimination of a potential threat to Japan.

-- to destroy the main aircraft factories and ship repair facilities on the west coast of the United States.

-- to damage the Panama Canal.

-- invasion of the west coast of North America.

PART II - CANADIAN

10. From the General Appreciation, the Canadian position can be seen in its proper perspective in relation to the broad strategic picture.

11. It will be seen that objectives in Canada are unlikely to be included in the probable main strategical aims of the enemy. They may figure in his lesser aims, but only as an adjunct to his main strategy. In any event, the Canadian position cannot be considered apart from that of the United States, and thus the problem is one which affects the whole of the North American Continent.

12. Under present conditions an invasion on either coast is not considered to be a practicable operation of war. The presence of the British and United States fleets in the Atlantic precludes the possibility of a large scale sea-borne expedition. The immense distances involved and the maintenance of superior United States naval forces in the American Pacific produce a similar situation on the West Coast.

13. Apart entirely from the above considerations, the consolidation and exploitation of her gains in the southwestern Pacific would produce more attractive results for Japan than any diversion of effort towards North America and with far less risk. The area of her present operations has the added advantage of geographical remoteness from the growing strength of the United States.

14. The remaining enemy strategical aims which affect the direct defence of Canada are limited to raids which may include carrier-borne air attack, sporadic naval bombardment, small landing parties for destruction of selected objectives, and submarine activity.

CONCLUSION

15. The sea, land and air forces of Canada and the United States are so disposed as to provide indirect protection for both Seaboards and direct protection for the most likely enemy objectives. The existing United States-Canada Basic Defence Plans provide for the utilization to the best advantage of the combined forces.

16. We consider that, taking into account the known and predictable factors, Canadian defence measures - existing and proposed - will ~~be adequate to deal with~~ provide reasonable insurance against the forms and scales of attack envisaged in this Appreciation.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Ottawa, February 26th, 1942.

CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

A meeting of the War Committee of the Cabinet was held in Room 401, House of Commons, on Thursday, February the 26th, at 4 p.m.

There were present the following members:

The Prime Minister (Mr.King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr.Ralston),
The Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr.Ilsley),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr.Michaud),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr.Howe),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr.Macdonald).

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Robertson),
The Secretary (Mr. Heeney).

Delivery of icebreaker to Russia

1. The Secretary reported that word had been received from the U.K. government that they were deeply concerned by delays which had occurred in the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of the icebreaker "Montcalm", regarding which approval had been given by the War Committee on October the 29th, 1941. The U.K. High Commissioner had asked whether the government would institute an enquiry into the matter, and had asked the earliest possible date on which the vessel could put to sea.

A full report of the facts had been obtained from the Deputy Minister of Transport. Difficulties regarding crew and with regard to bunkers had been the principal causes of delay and the vessel had had to put back to port on two occasions, after leaving Halifax in convoy. The expectation now was that she would be ready for sea by February the 28th.

(Secretary's note, February 25, 1942 - C.W.C. document 99; letter, Deputy Minister of Transport to the Secretary, and attached memorandum from the Director of Marine Services - February 26, 1942.)

2. The Minister of Munitions and Supply said that he had been kept informed of the situation. The basic difficulties had been to obtain a competent crew, and the unsuitability of the vessel for a North Atlantic crossing at this season. The circumstances

FOLDER NO. 7

The Board's Journal had expressed the view that defence provisions at Sault Ste. Marie should be reviewed. This brought to mind the broader question of policy regarding protection of vulnerable points. The Army could not and should not be asked to undertake this responsibility.

14. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services observed that the government could not undertake to guard all vital points. Many places in Canada, for example certain railway bridges, were more vulnerable than the Canadian locks at the Sault. At present, the Committee on Vulnerable Points followed the policy of leaving responsibility for protection upon the proprietors. It would be extremely difficult to change this policy for one involving differentiation between the many locations in respect of which protection might be desirable. Consideration might be given to using the National Resources Mobilization Act to call out men for police duty.

15. The War Committee noted the submission of the Journal of the Board for their twenty-fifth meeting; as to the protection of vulnerable points, it was agreed that no change be made in the present policy followed by the Vulnerable Points Committee.

Movement of Japanese from British Columbia

16. The Prime Minister referred to the magnitude of the task of implementing the government's recent decision to evacuate all persons of Japanese race from the protected area on the Pacific Coast and make provision for them elsewhere. A special organization should be set up for this purpose. It would be useless to proceed by piecemeal methods. Justice (through the R.C.M. Police), the Army, or possibly Munitions and Supply might be agencies in which responsibility should be centred.

17. The Minister of Munitions and Supply suggested that temporary accommodation for the large numbers involved might be provided at Banff and Jasper. A local British Columbia Committee, or the Army might provide the organization.

18. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs observed that in the United States the problem was dealt with by the Army, which had the right to call upon other agencies of government for assistance as required.

19. The Secretary drew attention to the fact that the authority of the Labour Department to provide work camps for evacuated persons was restricted to male Japanese nationals. There had, as yet, been no amendment to the Order in Council providing for these camps, so as to correspond to the wider powers

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

now given to the Minister of Justice in respect of any or all persons within protected areas.

20. The Minister of National Defence expressed the view that the Army could not undertake responsibility for the evacuation. They were already overburdened, and Army personnel in British Columbia were preoccupied with problems of Pacific defence. Possibly they could provide for administration, housing and commissariat as was done with internment operations.

Transportation units for service in the United Kingdom

21. The Secretary reported that the U.K. government had again raised the question of special transportation personnel. A request for certain special units had been made in June, 1941, and postponed, pending clarification of the manpower situation. Some 3,500 men of various categories were involved.

(Secretary's note, February 17, 1942 - C.W.C. document 91).

22. Mr. Heeney said that the Chief of the General Staff was not in favour of the government accepting this commitment. Personnel in these categories were not available. The railways themselves were shorthanded. Transportation troops might have to be provided for the Canadian Army overseas, at a later date. If such formations were to be raised later on, they should be in Canadian units for service with the Canadian Army.

23. The War Committee agreed that this commitment could not be accepted, and that the U.K. government be informed accordingly.

Proposed impregnation of battle dress

24. The Secretary submitted a recommendation of the Minister of National Defence, to provide for the impregnation of battle dress as protection against vesicant gas attacks. The considerations upon which this recommendation was based were similar to those advanced in favour of proposals, submitted to the War Committee on February 16th last, for increased respirator production and for the manufacture of mustard gas in Canada.

The total cost of the proposed programme, including the construction of a plant, was estimated at $690,000, to March 31st, 1943. An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Departmental memorandum, February 16, 1942 - C.W.C. document 96).

25. The Minister of National Defence for Air again queried the value of gas for defence purposes.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

[illegible] 3462-B-4c
SW 6 8 Fld

HLK/ML, July 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY:

Dec. 28/43

Property Rights

Ian Mackenzie to T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, April 14, 1942, Ian Mackenzie Papers, MG27IIIB5, Vol. 25, 70-25-3, P.A.C.

With this letter Ian Mackenzie began the process that would strip Japanese Canadians of all real and personal property located within 100 miles of the Pacific Coast. It was followed by an Order in Council that froze the sale of farms owned by Japanese Canadians unless approved by the Director of the Soldier Settlement Board, an agency left over from the First World War. That Director was subsequently appointed Director of the Veteran's Land Act program under which he bought 750 of those farms from the Custodian of Enemy Property. Japanese Canadian property had originally been left with the Custodian of Enemy Property for protective purposes only. To enable him to sell Japanese Canadian property his powers were retroactively amended in January 1943 to permit the sale of property without the owners' consent. By 1947 some 11.5 million dollars of Japanese Canadian property had been sold for $5,373,317.64.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

3462-B-40c
O.A. 6 6 FILE

HLK/ML, July 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY:

Dec. 27/43

Opposition from the Civil Service

Dr. H.L. Keenleyside to N.A. Robertson, July 16, 1943, External Affairs Files, 3464-B-40-C, E.A.A.

Henry F. Angus to N.A. Robertson March 15, 1943, External Affairs file 3464-R-40, E.A.A.

These documents illustrate that some government officials put their careers on the line to defend Japanese Canadians. As these documents demonstrate there were persons within the government who would openly criticize repressive measures against Japanese Canadians as "unjustifiable on any basis of decency or humanity."

Policy on Licences to Purchase Land and Maintenance

Note for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 12, 1943, External Affairs File 4606-C-13-40, E.A.A.

Minutes, Interdepartmental Committee on Japanese Questions, June 30, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-B-40C, E.A.A.

Memorandum on Maintenance, December 27, 1943, External Affairs File 3464-B-40C, E.A.A.

These documents illustrate the policies applied to Japanese Canadians while incarcerated in the government's detention camps. They clearly rebutt the apologist idea that the government was trying to protect Japanese Canadians. It should be noted the neither prisoners of war nor persons interned under the Geneva Convention had to pay for their own incarceration. Only Japanese Canadians, who were guilty only of being of the same race as an enemy, were required to impoverish themselves so that the government could not be accused of treating them softly.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

3462-B-40

HLK/ML, July 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY:

Treatment of Persons of Japanese Racial Origin in Canada.

1 - I have read the attached copy of a minute of a meeting held in the Department of External Affairs on June 30, 1943 at which various questions relating to the treatment of persons of Japanese origin in Canada were considered.

2 - The American and Far Eastern Division was not invited to send a representative to the meeting and no person connected with the Division received any indication that such a meeting was to be held. This is the second time within recent months that this subject has come up and has been handled without any reference to this Division in spite of the fact that it is a matter in which this Division is vitally interested. I have shown you a copy of the memorandum which I addressed to Mr. Wrong on the first occasion on which this happened. I have shown you also Mr. Wrong's reply. Now that the matter has come up again I suggest that a note from the Under Secretary to the Chiefs of the Legal Division and the European Division, indicating that matters of policy relating to Orientals in Canada are not to be settled without discussion with the American and Far Eastern Division, would be appropriate.

3 - With regard to the views expressed at the meeting of June 30, I have only the usual comments to make. They are:

(a) that apparently no distinction whatever was drawn between Japanese nationals and Canadian nationals;

(b) that the arguments used to justify the policy of forced sale of Japanese assets are partial and misleading. Insofar as they are statements of fact they could be used to support the view that a policy of "liquidation with consent" would be successful;

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

FOLDER NO. 7

(c) that the policy on relief is unjustifiable on any basis of decency or humanity, unless it is assumed that all Japanese can obtain work if they want it. Any such assumption would be unjustified in the circumstances.

These points have all been made before and I do not anticipate that any more attention will be paid to them now than has been the case in the past. I feel very strongly, however, that the Department of External Affairs should not be put in a position of acquiescing in such policies without first making it clear that their character is understood and that the reasons for their adoption by other departments of the Government are recognized.

(H. L. KEENLEYSIDE
ASST-UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS)

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

HFA/AG
March 15, 1943.

3464-R-40

File 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERTSON

The Expropriation of Land belonging to Canadians of Japanese Race in the Protected Area of British Columbia

A recent Order-in-Council P.C. 469 of January 19, 1943, together with an earlier Order P.C. 5523 of June 29, 1942 as amended by P.C. 6885 of August 4, 1942, gives the Custodian the power to liquidate, sell, or otherwise dispose of any property of persons of Japanese race in respect of which he has been vested with the power and responsibility of control and management. It is also provided that for the purpose of such liquidation, sale, or other disposition, the Consolidated Regulations Respecting Trading with the Enemy 1939 shall apply mutatis mutandis as for the property belonging to an enemy within the meaning of the said Consolidated Regulations.

2. There are no doubt some cases in which it may be for the benefit of every one concerned that the Custodian should have these wide powers. The Order has however called forth some protests because it would legalize acts of gross injustice and oppression.

3. In particular the Order would make it possible for the farm of a Canadian citizen, against whom no offence had been proved or even alleged, to be sold without his consent provided that he were Japanese by race. Not only might this citizen be of unimpeachable character, but he has already been called on to make very great sacrifices in the interests of public security. Through no fault of his own he has been deprived of the major part of his earning power, has been removed from his home, has seen his children's educational opportunities gravely impaired, and finds himself in a position in which he may be substantially forced to use the proceeds of the enforced liquidation of his capital assets to meet what would for citizens of other races be considered normal living expenses.

FOLDER NO. 7

4. announced It does not appear that any argument has been ~~devised~~ by the Military, Naval, Air Force or police authorities for depriving such a citizen of the ownership of his land, and it may even be doubtful if an Order-in-Council under the War Measures Act can operate to give the Custodian the power to convey a valid title to the land to a purchaser, since the Federal Government appears to be trespassing on Provincial authority to a degree not warranted by the emergency of war.

5. However this may be there appears to be a number of reasons against an exercise of the Custodian's power which would operate in the way described above: (a) The Prime Minister has stated in the House of Commons that Japanese would be treated justly; (b) The compulsory sale of the property of the law-abiding citizen, who is treated as an enemy on racial grounds alone, appears to be in entire conflict with the principles set out in the Atlantic Charter to which the Canadian Government has adhered; (c) The compulsory sale of these properties is in complete conflict with British tradition; (d) The compulsory sale of these properties is in complete conflict with United States policy and indeed with the constitutional provisions which condition this policy.

6. These considerations explain why protests are being received which show concern on the part of seriously minded people. For example the Reverend W. H. A. Norman of St. George United Church, Vancouver, British Columbia. Mr. Norman compares the measure to the Nurnberg laws against the Jews (though there of course, give no pecuniary compensation)

7. In so far as enemy aliens are concerned, that is to say persons of Japanese nationality, we are in the peculiar position of having transmitted to Great Britain, for use in correspondence concerning the treatment of

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

British and Canadian property in Japan and in Shanghai, a statement that liquidation takes place only when it is in the interests of the owner concerned. I am writing to the Custodian to enquire what modification, if any, of this statement should be made in view of the recent Order-in-Council. (see Telegram attached)

8. On the basis of the foregoing two recommendations are made: (1) That a memorandum should be submitted to the Prime Minister showing clearly the case in which the law-abiding citizen may be deprived of his property without his consent. It is quite possible for this case to have been overlooked when the Order was drafted and it is the Prime Minister's personal concern, to some extend, if his guarantee of just treatment is repudiated; (2) It will be quite possible for an administrative instruction to be issued which would prevent the use of the powers given by the Order-in-Council in the manner described above. If such an administrative instruction is given, it should receive sufficient publicity to prevent the growth of belief among responsible citizens that the Canadian Government is emulating the Nurnberg decrees.

9. Attention is called to the Custodian's memorandum of March 11 describing the advisory committees set up in British Columbia and setting out their terms of reference.

(Letter)
Colonel - Mackenzie may think they did not think it wise to forward.
HFA.

(HFA - HENRY F ANGUS)

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

JER/LJS
Aug.12/43

NOTE FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Licence to Japanese to authorize purchase of property in Canada

3464-R-40
3

1. D.O.C. Regulation 39E provides that no person of the Japanese race shall have the capacity, after February 24, 1942, during the War, to acquire or hold land or growing crops in Canada.

2. By para.(4)(a) the Minister of Justice is empowered, if it appears to him to be in the public interest so to do, to grant to a person of Japanese race a licence to acquire or hold land in Canada. This special power is by way of exception to the general ban upon the acquisition of land.

3. The Deputy Minister of Justice, by letter June 15, asked whether this Department had any view, as a matter of policy, on the question as to whether Japanese should be granted or refused a licence to purchase and hold land in Canada.

4. After consultation with the Committee considering various Japanese questions, including representatives of External Affairs, Custodian of Enemy Property, Foreign Exchange Control Board, Immigration, Labour, and Mines and Resources, the Deputy Minister of Justice was informed by our letter of July 7, 1943 that there were no considerations of international policy that would require the Minister either to grant or to refuse licences to purchase and hold land in Canada.

5. It was, however, indicated:

(a) that it might be embarrassing to the Department in its international relations if, as a result of licences issued to enable the purchase and holding of lands by Japanese, a situation arose in which it became necessary to divest the Japanese of their lands a second time;

(b) that one type of case might involve special consideration. A sale by a Japanese national, preliminary to

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

repatriation, to a Japanese national or to a British subject of Japanese race, might well be approved even although there might be reluctance to authorize acquisition of land from a non-Japanese transferor.

6. In Mr. Varcoe's letter to Mr. Pickersgill, July 6, 1943, it is intimated that the Minister of Justice would like to have the question brought to the attention of the Prime Minister, having regard to the fact that a licence granted might be interpreted by the licensee and others as indicating that the Japanese purchaser would be permitted after the war to continue to reside in Canada and at the place where the land acquired was held.

7. I have consulted the American and Far Eastern Division with regard to the question of policy which is involved, namely, whether Japanese nationals and Canadian nationals of Japanese race are to be subject to general deportation after the war. I have received a note to the effect that there would be no objection to allowing sales in certain cases:

(a) The Government has not decided on its post-war policy.

(b) It is improbable that any general deportation will be arranged.

(c) If persons of Japanese race are to be deported against their will, the fact that they hold property in Canada will be unimportant.

It is pointed out that a forced sale would be a minor hardship in comparison with the major hardship implicit in deportation.

8. In these circumstances I should think that the Minister of Justice could be informed that it would be undesirable to grant licences to purchase land on an extensive scale, but that there would be no objection to granting licences in exceptional cases, where such a course was desirable in order to give effect to the general governmental policy of evacuation from the protected areas in British Columbia. This would be particularly true in cases like the one which is referred to in Mr. Varcoe's letter, where the applicant and his wife are both British subjects.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

3464-B-40C

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

MEETING JUNE 30, 1943,- JAPANESE QUESTIONS

I. DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS

1. Position of Personal Property

The course followed is based upon government policy accepted and embodied in P.C. 469, January 19, 1943, which provides for liquidation and disposition of the property. The reason behind policy is --

(a) In special circumstances of case the only way in which the matter can be dealt with in a practical way is to liquidate.

(b) This is the only course that will protect any element of Japanese interest in the property.

(c) Articles of religious and sentimental value are being excepted.

2. Real Property

Course followed is sale and liquidation under P.C. 649. Dictated by practical considerations, as there is no other effective way of preserving interests of Japanese. The property is of such a nature that it could not be preserved in its present form.

3. Property of Repatriates

They will be furnished with suitable certificates by Custodian, and there is no objection to transfer of title, provided that proceeds are vested in Custodian.

II. RELIEF

Department of Labour policy is not definitely settled in this respect. The following principles were recognized:

(a) Japanese should be required to use income from assets before receiving relief in any event.

(b) Able bodied Japanese, for whom work was available, should not be given relief.

(c) Other Japanese should be required to expend capital assets before asking for relief, reserving a substantial back log, which should take into account their family situation.

III. COMPULSORY EMPLOYMENT

It was recognized that care should be taken to avoid compulsory employment of Japanese. Where work was available they could be cut off from relief, but it would always be open to them to keep themselves out of their own funds or funds supplied from other sources.

FOLDER NO. 7

IV. COMPULSORY MOVEMENT

It was recognized that care should be taken to avoid a position which would involve practical internment. On the other hand, it is necessary to defend a policy in which there may be a ban on mass movement from essential jobs at work camps, provided that the departments are prepared to facilitate individual and small scale movements involving more or less permanent employment outside of camp areas.

V. LICENCES TO HOLD LAND

There was an exchange of views. Labour was inclined to favour the granting of licenses, but the general opinion was against it. It was recognized that it was not a point for External Affairs to decide.

VI. MIGRATION OF JAPANESE

It was generally recognized that we should not admit persons of Japanese race, whether or not they were United States citizens from the U.S.A.

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7

DECLASSIFIED = DÉCLASSÉ FAH
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS = AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

346-1-B-1-2

MAINTENANCE

There is no doubt that the present rate of maintenance ($12.00 for first adult, $11.00 for second adult, $6.00 first child, $5.00 each additional child up to total of eight persons, $3.00 each additional child.) without any supplementary source of income, is insufficient to obtain as balanced a diet as recommended by medical authorities for the maintenance of good health by occidentals, as well as sufficient clothing, etc. However, this statement should be qualified by taking into consideration the following points:

1. For a great number, probably more than half, the question of maintenance is not as vital to their welfare as would appear at first glance, due to the fact that employment in other parts of Canada at prevailing rates of pay for Canadians is readily available. However, it is another matter for those that are too old, or those who are physically unfit.

2. Apart from the new generation, a large proportion do not require the variety of foods to which occidentals are accustomed. Rice and other oriental foods form the major part of their diet, and as a consequence their food costs are lower.

3. A large number had private resources upon which they keep drawing little by little, to supplant their income from maintenance, although, of course, the number of these is continually diminishing.

4. It is quite probable that one of the prime points which the Canadian Authorities have to take into consideration, is the fact that in proportion to the increase in free maintenance (relief) allowed, so will the incentive for Japanese to seek and accept employment decrease.

5. Although I have taken special care to investigate, no actual sufferings from hunger or diet difficiencies were encountered, nor was anyone found to be suffering from actual shortage of clothing, although I reiterate that in a percentage of cases only a bare minimum of both are obtainable.

6. The platform upon which the Japanese leaders base their claim for an increase in maintenance is the present method of the Canadian Government of allowing a cost-of-living bonus to Canadian wage earners and relief recipients, to compensate for the cost-of-living increase. The cost of many of the staple items both grocery and miscellaneous,

SUNAHARA, ANN - GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
FOLDER NO. 7