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forces from the other side, as he thinks they may find it possible. He thinks it is a mistake that Australia should be used as a base on the Pacific. Everything now depends on strengthening India. The whole story was one of inadequate munitions, planes, tanks, etc., and a great inadequacy in numbers of men - all things arriving too late, although many shipments were on the way. Next couple of weeks will be decisive ones.

Dr. Soong told me much the same story, though he went into greater detail in confidence. He said, for example, that Chiang Kai-Shek had given him a full account of his sizing up of the situation in India. He felt that unless the British Government immediately granted self-government to India, so as to give them something to fight for, the cause will be hopeless there; that while the greater part of his address was made to the natives, with a view to securing their co-operation against Japan, the last part was directed straight to Britain, to have her realize the truth of what he was saying. He thought that Britain greatly exaggerated the danger between the Mohamedans and the Hindus; that that was the conventional attitude to take, but it was no good at this time. He spoke of there being little or no defence of India in the way of troops who were at all trained, and he was very fearful that Japanese forces might reach there at any moment. He said that it was almost impossible to believe how hard it was to get the British to move in some matters.

He told me, and said this was in greatest confidence, that the Chinese had intercepted in the early morning a message from reconnaissance planes to Tokyo telling the government of having observed a couple of battleships of the Prince of Wales class. One was the Prince of Wales, and the other the Repulse, which were at sea and away from any air protection. The Chinese government had immediately communicated this fact to some source in the Orient, but had received word to the effect that this could hardly be correct, and that they would not be able to get directions of their forces except by way of communicating with Britain first. At eleven o'clock, they were again told that a further message had been intercepted, giving additional information as to the whereabouts of the ships, and again it was stated that they could not get action for some time as it would involve a lot in the way of communications before anything could be done. At two o'clock, word was sent to them that both ships had been sunk. They still would not believe that there was any truth in the story. At midnight, it was given out from Britain as a fact that both ships were sunk.

Speaking of the U.S., he thought the Foreign Office was full of pacifists, who were slow and would not open their minds to the possibility of Japanese attack. He spoke very strongly about not trusting any of the Japanese.

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no matter how honourable they might appear to be, or how long they may have been away from Japan, naturalized, or even those who were born in the country. Everyone of them, he thought, would be saboteurs and would help Japan when the moment came. I agreed with him.

Dr. Soong was most appreciative of what Canada had done to assist the Chinese with munitions, and seemed to be particularly interested in what I told him of my report on the Chinese and of the knowledge gained when on a visit years ago. I gave to Soong a copy of my "Industry and Humanity", and to the two of them a copy of Rogers biography, and Karsh's photo of Pat and myself. They could not have been pleasanter or more friendly than they were. I found in Dr. Soong a man of the highest type.

Tonight, at the dinner at the Country Club, I felt as though I had not the strength to stand up just before going into dinner, and when Howe asked me if I would speak, I felt I could not get any thoughts together. However, I felt I must, because of the occasion, say something, and worked out a few ideas in the course of the meal. Howe first made a fine little speech in the way of welcome in reference to the Chinese themselves and their part in the war, of Canada's assistance in munitions, and made mention of their son being in the Orient in the forces allied with the Chinese.

I spoke of what the gathering represented of the past, present and the future, the bringing together of an ancient civilization with one of a younger civilization - the East and the West. Spoke a little of the Chinese culture, long history, etc.; then of their heroic part in the war - ten years of fighting, with loss of life, between soldiers and civilians, equal to that of the total population of Canada. Referred to this contribution of human life and sacrifice which China had placed between free nations and destruction. It is a terrific story, when it is told. Spoke of the part which they are now playing, and extended to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek the gratitude and thanks of the Canadian people and all free peoples. I then spoke of the new order that might come into being, and many nations represented at the table sharing in the preservation of freedom being symbolical of the new order that was emerging. Made a reference to McNaughton by referring to Mrs. McNaughton, who was present, and then to some of the others who were also present. I spoke of the contribution Universities had made in bringing together persons from different parts of the world. I should have spoken of my own tour in China and the particular mission at the time re opium traffic and doing away with head tax. Very stupidly I made no reference to it whatever, though I might have told a most interesting little story of thirty-three years ago in its relation to the present. However, what I did say seemed to make an appeal.